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THE PRESIDENTIAL MONOPOLY OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS
Raoul Berger*
A frequent recurrence to the fundamental principles of the constitution • . • [is] absolutely necessary to preserve the advantages of
liberty and to maintain a free government.-Massachusetts Constitution of I 780t
of the wonder that suffuses a child upon learning that
a mighty oak sprang from a tiny acorn fills one who peers behind the tapestry of conventional learning and beholds how meager
are the sources of presidential claims to monopolistic control of foreign relations.1 Sweeping formulation of such claims was made by
Woodrow Wilson, then president of Princeton University:

S

OMETHING

One of the greatest of the President's powers ... [is] his control,
which is very absolute, of the foreign relations of the nation. The
initiative in foreign affairs, which the President possesses without
any restriction whatever, is virtually the power to control them absolutely. The President ... may guide every step of diplomacy, and
to guide diplomacy is to determine what treaties must be made, if
the faith and prestige of the government are to be maintained. He
need disclose no step of negotiation until it is complete, and when
in any critical matter it is completed the government is virtually
committed. Whatever its disinclination, the Senate may feel itself
committed also.2
Wilson felt no need to advert to the constitutional problems presented by his statement, but apparently regarded it as dogma beyond
need of demonstration. In his own person as President of the United
States, Wilson was later to suffer a disastrous refutation when the
Senate rejected the Versailles Treaty and League of Nations, which
• Charles Warren Senior Fellow in American Legal History, Harvard University
Law School. A.B. 1932, University of Cincinnati; J.D. 1935, Northwestern University;
LL.M. 1938, Harvard University.-Ed.
I am indebted to Professor Milton Katz of the Harvard University Law School
for stimulating suggestions.
t MAss. CONST., art. XXVIIl (1780), in I B. POORE, FEDERAL AND STATE CoNSTITU•
TIONS, CoLONIAL CHARTERS 959 (1877). This constitution was John "Adams' handiwork."
1 P. SMITH, JOHN ADAMS 440 (1962). The New Hampshire Constitution of 1784, art. I,
§ 38, contains an almost identical provision, 2 B. PooRE, supra, at 1283, as does the
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, art. XIV. 2 id. at 1542.
I. The word "monopoly" is borrowed from the caption "Negotiation a Presidential
Monopoly" in E. Corwin's 1953 revision of the official CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES OF .AMERICA-ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 412.
2. W. WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 77-78 (1908),
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he had negotiated according to his dogma. The cost of presidential
absolutism came high.3
Today, we are told, war is merely an instrument of foreign policy;4 four times in this century presidential foreign policy has entangled us in great wars-World Wars I and II, Korea, and Vietnam.ls
As Wilson indicated, the President's foreign policy can present the
nation with an all but irreversible fait accompli.6 At a time when the
havoc of war immediately threatens every man, woman, and child,
when the sacrifices war requires in property, blood, even life itself,
are staggering,7 it needs to be asked whether the Founders left such
risks for the decision of a single man. 8
3. Wilson stated that the "spirit of the Constitution" called on the President to
keep "himself in confidential communication with the leaders of the Senate while
his plans are in course, when their advice will be of service to him and his information
of the greatest service to them, in order that there may be veritable counsel and a real
accommodation of views instead of a final challenge and contest." Id. at 139-40.
4. "[T]he military machine has simply become an instrument for achieving presidential policy objectives." Monaghan, Presidential War-Making, 50 B.U. L. REv. 19, lll
(1970); Reveley, Presidential War-Making: Constitutional Prerogative or Usurpation?,
55 VA. L. REv. 1243, 1245-46 (1969). Clausewitz, the pioneer military theorist, regarded
war "as a continuation of national policy." B. TUCHMAN, THE GUNS OF AuGusr 95
(1962). Our war in Vietnam is the creature of presidential foreign policy.
5. Edward Corwin wrote: "Our three wars of outstanding importance prior to
World War II were all the direct outcome of Presidential policies in the making
of which Congress had but a minor part." E. CORWIN, TOTAL WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION 13 (1947) [hereinafter CoRWIN, TOTAL WAR]. For Franklin Roosevelt's prewar
policy, sees. MORISON, THE OXFORD HlsTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 991-1001 (1965).
The President "has always possessed the power to bring the country to war, if he so
chose." McDougal &: Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy (pts. 1-2), 54 YALE L.J. 181, 535,
at 614 (1945). "[P]residential hegemony over the shaping of foreign policies ••• lead
to the need to use armed forces." Reveley, supra note 4, at 1304.
6. E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 274 (3d ed. 1948) [hereinafter
CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT] refers to the "ability of the President simply by his day-to-day
conduct of our foreign relations to create situations from which escape except by the
route of war is difficult or impossible." The President may "so conduct the foreign
intercourse, the diplomatic negotiations with other governments, as to force a
war .•.." J. POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES§ 672, at 447 (3d ed. 1875). See also Reveley, supra note 4, at 1245-47. Cf. text accompanying note 2 supra. The President "may conduct a vital phase of foreign policy
literally for years without Congressional control, as with foreign policy toward Japan
before the last war, toward Russia during the war, and toward China after the war."
Such policy-making "may lead to policies for which there is inadequate support, as
with Wilson, and had not Pearl Harbor intervened, conceivably with Roosevelt." R.
DAHL, CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY 173 (1950).
7. As Hugh Gaitskill, leader of the British Labor Party, said in 1960, "[F]oreign
affairs concern the lives and destinies of all of us today." Quoted in P. RxcHARDs,
PARLIAMENT AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 72 (1967). In England, "it has been abundantly
clear to the majority of voters that their well-being and their very existence depends far
more upon international developments than on domestic political issues." Id. at 31.
8. "The conclusion is unavoidable, for example, that in the years preceding Pearl
Harbor, President Roosevelt and his advisers believed that many of their foreign
policies could not have secured the support of a majority in Congress. Important
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The mounting tide of "executive agreements," many of which
are kept secret from the Senate,9 led the Senate in February 1972 to
vote 81 to O for the Case Bill,10 which would require that all international agreements be sent to the Congress for information. Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., thereafter introduced a bill that would authorize Congress to veto any executive agreement within sixty days of its
transmittal. 11 Do such bills constitute an unconstitutional invasion
of exclusive presidential prerogatives? This question is a facet of the
broader issue of "executive privilege": may information respecting
the conduct of foreign affairs-for example, the disbursement of
funds appropriated for defense12 or for foreign aid,13 or the acquisition of foreign bases 14-be withheld from Congress on the ground
that congressional inquiry encroaches on presidential prerogatives?
Because of the widespread ramifications of foreign relations, discussion must perforce be confined to presidential executive agreements, and whether the Senate may be excluded from knowledge of,
and participation in, negotiations with foreign nations as a part of
the treaty-making process. 15 Mention only can be made of the legisforeign policies were made without prior or subsequent congressional consent." R.
DAHL, supra note 6, at 178. He adds: "President and State Department believed they
had information, experience, and a grasp of issues involved that the Congress and
electorate lacked." Id. at 180.
9. See note 191 infra and accompanying text.
10. S. 596, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. See ll8 CoNG. REc. S. 1904-10 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 1972).
See generally N.Y. Times, May I, 1972, at 32, col. 1. For sequel, see note 14 infra.
11. S. 3475, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. See ll8 CoNG. REc. S. 5787-88 (daily ed. April 11,
1972). See generally N.Y. Times, May 1, 1972, at 32, col. I. For subsequent developments, see note 14 infra.
12. Judge Learned Hand asked, "[I)s it not possible to argue that Congress, especially
now that the appropriations for the Armed Forces are the largest items of the
budget, should be allowed to inquire in as much detail as it wishes, not only how
past appropriations have in fact been spent, but in general about the conduct of the
national defense?" L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 17-18 (1958).
13. See Hearings on S. 1125 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1971) [hereinafter Hearings].
Senator J.W. Fulbright, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, testified:
"I have made repeated efforts to secure access to the 5-year plan for military assistance
for use by the Foreign Relations Committee in its consideration of military assistance
under the foreign aid authorization bill." In vain.
14. On June 19, 1972, the Senate voted to cut off funds for recently concluded
military base agreements with Portugal and Bahrein unless the agreements are submitted to the Senate as treaties. The Executive did not comply with an earlier Senate
resolution asking for submission of the executive agreements as treaties on the ground
that they had already been concluded. ll8 CoNG. REc. S. 9653 (daily ed. June 19, 1972);
N.Y. Times, June 20, 1972, at I, col. l; at 15, col. I. Many millions of dollars were
involved.
15. Recall Wilson's 1908 remark that the President "need disclose no step of
negotiation until it is complete ••• [and then] the government is virtually committed," at text accompanying note 2 supra. True, Congress may reject a treaty,
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lative shortcomings which have contributed to the all but total takeover of foreign relations by the President, and of the need for procedural reform in the Senate if its participation is to be effective.16
Could we view the matter as an original question, that is, were we
drafting or amending a Constitution and free to decide where power
is best vested, such factors might persuade that exclusive power in
the premises is best lodged in the President. Apart from the countervailing considerations, however, if the Constitution provides for
Senate participation in treaty-making, the Senate cannot now be
barred on the ground that it lacks the wisdom and machinery to
participate effectively.17 "The peculiar circumstances of the moment,"
said Marshall, "may render a measure more or less wise, but cannot
render it more or less constitutional." 18 Accordingly, the focus of
discussion will be the constitutionality of presidential monopoly
claims. The starting place, of course, must be the constitutional
text itself, in the light of such illumination as is provided by the
intention of the Framers and the understanding of the Ratifiers.
I.

A.

NEGOTIATION OF TREATIES

The Text of the Constitution

Article II, section 2, of the Constitution provides that the President
shall have power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
to make Treaties ... and he shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other
public Ministers ....
Section 3 provides that "he shall receive Ambassadors and other
public Ministers . . . ." From these provisions Justice Sutherland
distilled his often quoted statement that with respect to
external affairs . . . participation in the exercise of the power is
significantly limited. In this vast external realm . . . the President
but the shift in policy may have "disastrous consequences for the international structure of power." R. DAHL, supra note 6, at 97.
16. For an excellent discussion of the entire problem, see R. DAHL, supra note 6.
See also text accompanying notes 293-311 infra.
17. For improvements in the congressional machinery, see R. DAHL, supra note 6,
at 146-48. Many consider the presidential policy that involved us in the Vietnam War a
monumental folly, among them General Charles de Gaulle. See Berger, War-Making by
the President, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 29, 83 (1972) [hereinafter Berger, War-Making]. R.
DAHL, supra, at 264, states that "to the extent that the executive is capable of solving
its problems without accepting Congressional collaboration, it must become more and
more the democratic shadow" of a "frank dictatorship." See also id. at 116.
18. G. GUNTHER, JOHN MARsHALL's DEFENSE OF McCULLOCH v. MARYLAND 190-91
(1969).
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alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the
nation. He makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate;
but he alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it.19
When, however, we look to the text, we find that the only power
given to the President alone was the power to "receive Ambassadors."
Even the power to "appoint Ambassadors" was made subject to
Senate "advice and consent."
Some years after the Constitutional Convention, Hamilton placed
exaggerated emphasis on the power to receive Ambassadors,20 ignoring the pains he himself took in The Federalist No. 69 to downgrade the power:
The President is also to be authorized to receive ambassadors and
other public ministers. This, though it has been a rich theme of
declamation, is more a matter of dignity than of authority. It is a
circumstance which will be without consequence in the administration of the government; and it was far more convenient . . . than
that there should be a necessity of convening the legislature . . .
upon every arrival of a foreign minister . . . .21
Before he ascended to the bench, Justice Sutherland wrote a book
in which he stated: "It will be observed that the advice and consent
of the Senate qualifies the power of the President to make, and not
to negotiate, treaties." 22 The wish was father to that thought. No
mention whatever of "negotiate" is to be found in the constitutional
text, so that it could hardly be singled out for qualification. What
power to "negotiate" a treaty exists must derive from the power to
"make" a treaty; and since the "make" power is expressly subject to
"advice and consent," it follows that the power to "negotiate" a
treaty is likewise so qualified. Nor does history disclose an intention
to separate the "negotiate" component for independent presidential
exercise; to the contrary, as will appear, the Founders intended the
Senate to participate in all stages of treaty-making. They knew well
enough how to single out a particular function for independent
presidential exercise, as when they provided that the President
19. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (emphasis
original). It should be borne in mind that in addition to participation in treaty-making
and the appointment of ambassadors by the Senate, Congress has exclusive power over
other aspects of foreign relations, namely, foreign commerce and duties or tariffs. U.S.
CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3.
20. See text accompanying notes 90-92 infra.
21. THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 451 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1941).
22. G. SUTHERLAND, CoNSTITITl'IONAL POWER AND WORLD AFFAIRS 122 (1919) (emphasis
original).
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"shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors ...." The fact that they did not
equally provide that "he shall negotiate, and by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, make treaties" speaks volumes against
the Sutherland reading. The comparison was tellingly drawn by
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, himself no mean historian:
[T]he carefully phrased section gives the President absolute and unrestricted right to nominate, and the Senate can only advise and
consent to the appointment, of a given person. All right to interfere
in the remotest degree with the power of nomination and the consequent power of selection is wholly taken from the Senate. Very
different is the wording of the treaty clause. There the words "by
and with the advice and consent of" come in after the words "shall
have power" and before the power referred to is defined. The "advice
and consent of the Senate" are therefore coextensive with the
"power" conferred on the President, which is "to make treaties,"
and apply to the entire process of treaty-making.23

As Lodge's analysis indicates, the textual terms are to be scrutinized with greatest care, the more so because the Framers were fastidious draftsmen. What Chief Justice Taney discerned on the face
of the Constitution is richly attested by the Convention records:
"[N]o word was unnecessarily used, or needlessly added.... Every
word appears to have been weighed with the utmost deliberation,
and its force and effect to have been fully understood.'' 24
What does the word "advice" connote? As early as 1806, Senator
Anderson pointed out that the "advice should precede the making
of the treaty," that the word was employed "for the purpose of obtaining the opinion of the Senate as to the principles upon which the
treaty should be made.'' 25 In 1906, Senator Augustus Bacon developed this analysis: "We do not advise men after they have made up
their minds and after they have acted; we advise men while they are
considering, while they are deliberating, and before they have determined, and before they have acted." 26 Unless "advice" is so understood, it is superfluous; it would have sufficed to require only Senate
"consent" for the "making" of a treaty. So the process was understood
by President Washington.27
In 1917, Edward S. Corwin countered with the argument that "in
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Quoted in R. HAYDEN, THE SENATE AND TREATIES: 1787-1817, at 17 (1920).
Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 571 (1840).
Quoted in R. HAYDEN, supra note 23, at 202 n.1.
40

CONG.

R.Ec. 2126.

See text accompanying notes 62-77 infra. See also remarks of Rufus King, who
had been a Framer, text accompanying note 141 infra.
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connection with appointments the Senate's function of 'advice and
consent' is discharged by a mere 'yes' and 'no.' " 28 "Advice" does not
come too late when it surfaces after a "nomination," for the nomination has in nowise committed the President or the nation. But to be
effective, "advice" respecting "making" of a treaty must come before
the positions of the negotiating parties have crystallized. In any event,
Corwin leaves unanswered why "nomination" was freed of "advice
and consent" whereas "treaty-making" was not. He himself later
stated that "the Constitutional clause evidently assumes that the
President and the Senate will be associated throughout the entire
process of making a treaty ... .''29

B.

The Understanding of the Founders

Few are the instances in which deductions from the text are so
unmistakably confirmed by the meaning attached to the terms by
the Founders themselves. But first a glimpse of the English antecedents, for the Framers were constantly alive to English practices.30
Perhaps the most extensive claim to participation in foreign affairs was made by the House of Commons in a petition to James I
of December 9, 1621, which stated with respect to matters of peace
and war, "we cannot conceive that ... the state of your kingdom, are
matters at any time unfit for our deepest consideration in time of
Parliament ... .''31 The constitutional changes in the conduct of for28. E. CoRWIN, THE PRESIDENT'S CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 183 n.4 (1917)
(emphasis original) [hereinafter CORWIN, CONTROL].
29. E. CORWIN, supra note 1, at 412. In THE PRESIDENT, supra note 6, at 253, Corwin
states that the "significant thing" about the phraseology of the treaty-clause "is
that it associates the President with the Senate throughout the entire process of treatymaking." (Emphasis original.) McDougal &: Lans, supra note 5, at 553, state: "The
Framers assumed ••• that the Senate would participate equally with the President in
the active direction of all negotiations and all aspects of foreign policy ••••" See also
id. at 220. Compare ·with the foregoing history Dean Acheson's assertion that "the
negotiation of [a treaty] is given to one branch and the ratification to another."
Hearings, supra note 13, at 264. He considered that the Senate was limited to "exercising its constitutional power to make a treaty by ratifying it." Id. at 261.
30. On a related point, George Mason said in the Convention, "He considered the
caution observed in Great Britain on this point as the paladium [sic] of the public
liberty." 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 327 (1911).
Madison referred to British appropriation practices in THE FEDERALIST No. 41, supra
note 21, at 265. Madison, John Marshall, and others assured the Virginia convention
that the provision for jury trial carried with it all its attributes under English practice;
including, specifically, the right to challenge jurors. 3 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 531, 546,
558-59, 573 (2d ed. 1836). See R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CoNSTITUnONAL PROBLEMS
87 n.160, 143 n.97, 197, 217-18 (1972) [hereinafter BERGER, IMPEACHMENT]. Cf. id. at 4,
30 n.107, 89, 98, 99, 101, 122, 171 n.217. See also note 45 infra.
31. J. TANNER, CONSI'ITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS OF THE REIGN OF JAMES I, A.D. 1603•
1625, at 281 (1930).
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eign affairs during the revolutionary seventeenth century-by which
the Founders were more influenced than by eighteenth century developments32-have been admirably described by Edward B. Turner,
and for present purposes a few examples drawn from Turner may
suffice. By virtue of its power over supplies, Parliament constrained
the headstrong James I to promise "to make no treaty without first acquainting parliament and requesting its advice."33 When "the long
parliament was sitting the king informed the members of the alliance
which he was about to make with the Dutch, and asked for advice."3'
After the Restoration, "the commons aimed at nothing less than direction and control .... More and more, information was called for,
and the commons insisted on a share in foreign policy if they were to
supply the means of carrying it out."35 In 1763, "the lord chancellor
declared ... that 'the King ... hath made your Counsels the Foundation of all His Proceedings' [abroad]."36 The Parliament objected
that negotiations respecting the second partition treaty (1700) "had
been carried through without the advice of parliament" and "then
proceeded to impeach those who had assisted William in making
it." 37 In the Hanoverian period, the "participation of parliament in
foreign affairs and even its supervision of them was . . . fully recognized, but not its power to direct them." 38 By 1714, "Parliament
32. B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN R.EvOLUTION (1967).
Compare colonial reliance on Coke for judicial review, notwithstanding that Blackstone
had plumped for "parliamentary supremacy," R. BERGER, CONGRESS v. THE SUPREME
CoURT 23-26, 29 n.101 (1969) [hereinafter BERGER, CONGRESS]; and their frequent references to Stuart absolutism, BERGER, IMFEACHMENT, supra note 30, at 5, 99; Goebel,
Constitutional History and Constitutional Law, 38 CoLUM. L. REv. 555, 563 (1938);
note 45 infra.
33. Turner, Parliament and Foreign Affairs, 1603-1760, 38 ENG. Hisr. REv. 172,
174 (1919).
34. Id. at 175.
35. Id. at 176.
36. Id. at 177. In 1701 the Commons advised the King to act in concert with the
States General in treaty negotiations with France "to conduce to their security": the
King responded he had done so. 5 PARL. Hisr. ENG. 1243 (1701). The King communicated the posture of the negotiations and in closing said that the "safety of England •••
does very much depend upon your Resolutions in this matter." Id. at 1250. In 1709,
both Houses advised Queen Anne as to measures for a secure peace. 6 PARL. Hisr.
ENG. 788 (1709).
37. Turner, supra note 33, at 183. In 1715 the Commons "impeached Oxford because ••• he had misrepresented negotiations to the queen and hence to parliament,"
and so "prevented the just Advice of the Parliament to her Majesty." Id. at 188. Was it
sheer coincidence that James Iredell told the North Carolina Ratification Convention
that if the President "has concealed important intelligence" from the Senate and so
induced them to consent to a treaty, he could be impeached? 4 J. ELuoT, supra note
30, at 127.
38. Turner, supra note 33, at 188.
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had established a degree of control over the executive and over all
its actions-including foreign policy ...." 89
All this was part of the struggle between Parliament and the
King, which eventuated in parliamentary supremacy.40 Thereafter
came ministerial responsibility to Parliament rather than to the
King, and management of foreign affairs by Ministers who, under
orthodox theory, were under the control of Parliament. What such
control could mean is illustrated by a resolution passed by the House
of Commons in 1782-not without relevance to President Nixon's
disregard of the repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution41-condemning the "farther prosecution" of the war with the American
colonies on the ground that it was the means of "weakening the efforts of this country against her European enemies" and increasing
the "mutual enmity, so fatal to the interests both of Great Britain
and America."42 When the ministry disregarded this resolution, a
second resolution declared that "this House will consider as enemies"
those who advise the "farther prosecution" of the war "for the purpose of reducing the revolted Colonies to obedience by force." Now
Lord North buckled and bowed to the opinion of Parliament.48
The Founders, who cited the ongoing impeachment of Warren Hastings,« were hardly unfamiliar with these pages of Hansard.45
When the revolting colonies assembled in the Continental Congress and dispensed with an executive, they carried the movement
39. c. HILL, THE CENTURY OF REvoLUTION 1603-1714, at 2 (1961). Parliament had
emerged "as the leading partner." G. TREVELYAN, ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF ENGLAND
472 (1956).
40. See generally C. ROBERTS, THE GROWTH OF REsl'ONSIBLE GoVERNMENT 1N STUART
ENGLAND (1966).
41. Berger, War-Making, supra note 17, at 67.
42. 22 PARL. HIST. ENG. 1071 (1781-1782).
43. Id. at 1089, 1090, 1107 (1781-1782).
44. E.g., George Mason, 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 30, at 550; John Vining, I ANNALS
OF CONG. 373 (1789) (2d ed. 1836, print bearing the running page title "History of
Congress").
45. Hamilton's statement in THE FEDERALIST No. 69, supra note 21, at 450-51 may
suggest unfamiliarity with the English developments: "The king of Great Britain is
the sole and absolute representative of the nation in all foreign transactions. He can
of his own accord make treaties of peace, commerce • • • ." But he emphasized: "In
this respect • • • there is no comparison between the intended power of the President
and the actual power of the British sovereign. The one can perform alone what the
other can do only with the concurrence of a branch of the legislature."
But compare Gouverneur Morris' reminder that in England "the real King [is]
the Minister." 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 30, at 104. Cf. id. at 69. Note too the Founders'
familiarity with the details of English impeachment practices. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT,
supra note 30, at 54-55, 74-75, 84-85, 88-89. See also Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87,
108-09 (1925).
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for parliamentary supremacy to its logical conclusion. Experience
led them to make an exception for a Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
and John Jay was appointed to the post.46 But he was kept under a
tight rein, as the Journals of the Congress disclose. There could be
no secrets from Congress: "Any member of Congress shall have access" to the Secretary's books and records, read the resolution.47
To argue that all this was changed by the constitutional provision
for an executive branch and the separation of powers is to lose sight
of the course of historical development. The Framers-thirty of the
fifty-five had been members of the Continental Congress48-began
by adopting its practice. As late as August 6, the Convention Committee on Detail draft provided that "[t]he Senate ... shall have
power to make treaties." 49 During the debate, Madison "observed
that the Senate represented the States alone," and, consequently,
"the President should be an agent [not the exclusive agent] in Treaties."50 As the Convention drew to a close, the Committee of Eleven
proposed on September 4 that "[t]he President by and with the advice and Consent of the Senate, shall have power to make Treaties.''51
How this appeared to the Framers may be judged from Rufus King's
remarks that "as the Executive was here joined in the business, there
was a check [on the Senate] which did not exist in [the Continental]
Congress.'' 52 It was the President, therefore, who was :finally made a
participant in the treaty-making process, which had been initially
lodged-after the pattern of the Continental Congress-in the Sen46. 19 JOUR. CoNTL. CONG. 43 (1781); 20 JOUR. CoNTL. CoNG. 638 (1781).
47. 22 JOUR. CoNTL. CONG. 88 (1782).

48. The dual members were Abraham Baldwin, George Clymer, John Dickinson,
Thomas Fitzsimons, Benjamin Franklin, Elbridge Gerry, Nicholas Gilman, Nathaniel
Gorham, Bedford Gunning, Alexander Hamilton, Jared Ingersoll, Daniel of St. Thomas
Jenifer, William S. Johnson, Rufus King, John Langdon, James Madison, James
McHenry, Thomas Mifllin, Gouverneur Morris, Robert Morris, William Pierce, Charles
Pinckney, Edmund Randolph, George Read, John Rutledge, Roger Sherman, Richard
0. Spaight, George Washington, Hugh Williamson, and James Wilson.
The New Jersey Plan proposed to vest in Congress certain powers "in addition to
the powers vested in the United States in Congress, by the present existing articles of
Confederation." l M. FARRAND, supra note 30, at 243. In the New York Ratification
Convention, Chancellor R.R. Livingston explained that the Continental Congress "have
the very same" powers proposed for the new Congress, including the power "of
making war and peace ••• they may involve us in a war at their pleasure .•••" 2 J.
ELLIOT, supra note 30, at 278 (emphasis added).
49. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 30, at 183.
50. Id. at 392.
51. Id. at 498.
52. Id. at 540. "Not until September 7, ten days before the Convention's final adjournment, was the President made a participant in those powers." E. Corwin, supra
note I, at 412. Commenting on the concurrence of the two branches to make a treaty,
Patrick Henry stated "the President, as distinguished from the Senate, is nothing."
3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 30, at 353.
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ate alone. Not the slightest hint is to be found in the Convention
records that thereby the President was meant to nose out the Senate
from participation in any part of treaty-making. To the contrary,
Hamilton explained in The Federalist No. 75 that
the vast importance of the trust, and the operation of treaties as laws,
plead strongly for the participation of the whole or a portion of the
legislative body in the office of making them.... It must indeed be
clear to a demonstration that the joint possession of the power in
question, by the President and Senate, would afford a greater prospect of security, than the separate possession of it by either of them.53

The same point had earlier been made by John Jay in The Federalist No. 64, and though he appreciated that negotiations with those
who preferred to "rely on the secrecy of the President" might arise,
he stressed that such secrecy was with respect to "those preparatory
and auxiliary measures which are not otherwise important in a national view, than as they tend to facilitate the attainment of the objects of the negotiations." The President, "in forming [treaties] must
act by the advice and consent of the Senate."54 Corwin correctly reads
Jay to mean that "[o]ccasions may arise ... when the initiation of
a negotiation may require great secrecy and dispatch, and at such
times the President must undoubtedly start the ball rolling; but
otherwise all negotiations of treaties will be the joint concern of
President and Senate."55
The Ratification Conventions were given to understand that the
Senate, without qualification, was to participate in the making of
treaties. Some cumulative detail may be pardoned because of the
importance of this point. In New York, Chancellor R.R. Livingston
stated that the Senate "are to form treaties with foreign nations";
and Hamilton explained that "[t]hey, together with the President,
are to manage all our concerns with foreign nations." Chancellor
Livingston repeated that "[t]he Senate was to transact all foreign
business."56 In Pennsylvania, James Wilson said, "nor is there any
doubt but the Senate and President possess the power of making"
53. THE FEDERALIST No. 75, supra note 21, at 486, 488.
54. Id., No. 64, at 419, 420.
55. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, supra note 6, at 253 (emphasis added). James Wilson

told the Pennsylvania Convention, "I am not an advocate for secrecy in transactions
relating to the public; not generally even in forming treaties . • • yet sometimes
secrecy may be necessary, and therefore it becomes an argument against committing the
knowledge of these transactions to too many persons," that is, the House of Representatives. 2 J. Eu.IoT, supra note 30, at 506: the stock explanation why the House
was excluded from treaty-making. See, e.g., 3 id. at 509, 4 id. at 263, 280.
56. 2 J. ELLIOT, supra note 30, at 291, 306, 323.
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treaties.117 In North Carolina, Samuel Spencer stated that the Senate
"are, in effect to form treaties."58 And speaking to "intercourse with
foreign powers," James Iredell said that it is the President's "duty
to impart to the Senate every material intelligence he receives." If
he "has concealed important intelligence . . . and by that means
induced them [the Senate] to enter into measures ... which they
would not have consented to had the true state of things been disclosed to them," impeachment would lie.59 With good reason, therefore, do even those commentators who construe the President's authority broadly agree that "the Senate was made a participant in
his diplomatic powers." 60 Indeed, it would fly in the face of common
sense to deduce that the Framers, after taking great precautions, as
Jam.es Wilson said, to put it beyond the power of a "single man ...
to involve us in such distress [war],"61 then unraveled all their labors
by giving sole control of foreign policy, which can plunge a nation
into war, to that very "single man."
C.

Washington's Contemporaneous
Construction

Were the meaning of the constitutional text and the understanding of the Framers and Ratifiers doubtful, we have the best of con57. Id. at 506.
58. 4 id. at 116.
59. Id. at 127. William Davie, a Framer, explained to the North Carolina Convention "that jealousy of executive power which has shown itself so strongly in all
American governments, would not admit" of lodging the treaty power in the President alone. And because of "the extreme jealousy of the little states" it "became
necessary to give them an absolute equality in making treaties." Id. at 120. In other
words, Senate participation in treaty-making was required to satisfy small state
jealousy. C.C. Pinckney's remark in the South Carolina Convention that the Senate
was given "the power of agreeing or disagreeing to the terms proposed" by the
President, id. at 265, is opposed to the decided consensus that treaty-making was a
joint function.
60. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, supra note 6, at 366, 254; McDougal &: Lans, supra
note 5, at 207, 220. See also note 29 supra and accompanying text. Indeed, Corwin,
looking at "the constitutional landscape," concluded that "the legislative power, was
evidently intended originally to be the predominant one." CORWIN, TOTAL WAR, supra
note 5, at 158. Were confirmation needed, Madison's statement in THE FEDERAusr No.
51, supra note 21, at 338, should suffice: "In republican government, the legislative
authority necessarily predominates."
61. 2 J. ELLIOT, supra note 30, at 528. That acute student of constitutional government, Walter Bagehot, said that the Framers "shrank from placing sovereign power
anywhere. They feared it would generate tyranny; George ill had been a tyrant to
them, and come what might, they would not make a George III." W. BAGEHOT, THE
ENGLISH CoNmTUTION 218 (1964). It is virtually beyond debate that the intention of
the Founders was to confer all power connected with war-making on Congress, leaving
to the President only command of the armed forces and authority to repel sudden
attack. See text accompanying notes 125-26 infra. For extended discussion, see Berger,
War-Making, supra note 17.
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temporaneous constructions62-by the presiding officer of the Convention, George Washington, our first President. In August 1789,
he advised a Senate committee that
[i]n all matters respecting Treaties, oral communications [to the
Senate] seem indispensably necessary; because in these a variety of
matters are contained, all of which not only require consideration,
but some of them may undergo much discussion; to do which by
written communications would be tedious without being satisfactory. as
Oral communications proved impracticable; but Washington continued to seek the Senate's advice by message before opening negotiations and "during their course." 64
The facts have been beclouded by Corwin, who stated in 1917:
"At the outset, Washington sought to associate the Senate with himself in the negotiation of treaties, but this method of proceeding
went badly and was presently abandoned." 65 So, too, McDougal and
Lans stated in 1945,
it is clear that the Framers anticipated that the Senate would
normally function as an executive council, advising the President or
his subordinates during the course of negotiations, as had been the
case under the Articles of Confederation. This proposal for continuous consultation or for any significant degree of advance consultation
proved to be unworkable, and was abandoned during the administration of George Washington.66
All that "proved to be unworkable," however, was oral consultation
with the Senate, and this because such was the awe in which Washington was held that the Senate felt inhibited from necessary debate
by his presence.
In Washington's own view, treaties called for the independent
legislative judgment of the Senate. "In treaties," he wrote, the
agency of the Senate "is perhaps as much of a legislative nature, and
62. Respect for contemporaneous construction is deeply rooted in the past. In
1454, Chief Justice Prisot stated, "the Judges who gave these decisions in ancient times
were nearer to the making of the statute than we now are, and had more acquaintance
with it ••••" Windham v. Felbridge, Y.B. 33 Hen. 4, f. 38, 41 pl. 17, quoted in
C. Au.EN, I.Aw IN THE MAKING 193 (6th ed. 1958). For early American statements to the
same effect, see Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803); Ogden v. Saunders,
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 290 (1827).
63. 11 G. WASIDNGTON, WRITINGS 417 (W. Ford ed. 1891) (emphasis original).
64. S. CRANDALL, TREATIES, THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 68 (2d ed. 1916);
D. FLEMING, THE TREATY VEIO OF THE .AMERICAN SENATE 21 (1930): Washington "adhered to the practice of asking the advice of the Senate before negotiations were
opened and during their course."
65. CoRWIN, CoNTROL, supra note 28, at 85.
66. McDougal &: Lans, supra note 5, at 207.
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the business may possibly be referred to their deliberations in their
legislative chamber." 67 For details of Washington's first and last
visits to the Senate, we are indebted to the J oumal of Senator William Maclay. Washington told the Senate that "he had called on us
for our advice and consent to some propositions respecting the treaty
to be held with the southern Indians." 68 Those propositions were
stated under seven heads in a paper handed over by Washington.
Maclay spoke up: "The business is new to the Senate. It is of importance. It is our duty to inform ourselves, as well as possible, on the
subject." Lee wanted to read a particular treaty. "The business labored with the Senate. There appeared an evident reluctance to
proceed." Gunn then moved that a treaty with the Creeks be postponed until Monday; his motion was seconded. Maclay noted, "I
saw no chance of a fair investigation of subjects while the President
of the United States sat there, with his Secretary of War to support
his opinions, and overawe the timid and neutral part of the Senate."
The motion carried. Washington, Maclay records, was in a "violent
fret." Nevertheless, he appeared again on Monday, and again,
"shamefacedness, or I know not what, flowing from the presence of
the President, kept everybody silent." 69 Oral communication, so uncomfortable to all concerned, was thereupon abandoned. But that
"\,Vashington continued to seek advice from the Senate "before opening negotiations" is attested by a series of instances collected by
Crandall, and confirmed by others.70
To demonstrate "the right of the President to refuse the Senate
information with respect to a pending negotiation," Corwin alleges
that "this ground was first asserted by Washington against a call by
the House of Representatives for information with respect to the
negotiation of the Jay Treaty of 1794.''71 This is a strange citation,
for "in fact, all the papers affecting the negotiations . . . were laid
67. 11 G. WASHINGTON, supra note 63, at 418.
68. W. MACLAY, SKETCHES OF DEBATES IN THE FIRST SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
1789-90-91, at 122 (G. Harris ed. 1880).
69. Id. at 123-26. See also R. HAYDEN, supra note 23, at 20-27. Washington himself
realized that "it could be no pleasing thing . . • for the President, on the one hand,
to be present and hear the propriety of his nominations questioned, nor for the
Senate, on the other hand, to be under the smallest restraint from his presence from
the fullest and freest inquiry into the character of the person nominated." 11
G. WASHINGTON, supra note 63, at 418. That his presence would exercise a similar
"restraint" on the Senate's "inquiry" into a treaty escaped him.
70. S. CRANDALL, supra note 64, at 68-70; R. HAYDEN, supra note 23, at 27-28,
32-34, 40, 47, 51-52, 54-55; Black, The United States Senate and the Treaty Power, 4
RocKY MT. L. R.Ev. I, 6 (1931). See also note 64 supra. The practice, however, was not
invariable. R. HAYDEN, supra, at 37.
71. CORWIN, CONTROL, supra note 28, at 90.
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before the Senate.'' 72 The denial to the House was based on Washington's view that the treaty power was vested exclusively in the
President and Senate, so that there was no "right in the House of
Representatives to demand . . . all the papers respecting a negotiation with a foreign Power ...." He emphasized that he had no disposition to "withhold any information ... which could be required
of him as a right," instancing an impeachment proposal by the
House.73 This is poor stuff from which to fashion a right to refuse
to the Senate information respecting pending negotiations.
A second point later made by Corwin stands no better. For his
statement that "the relations of President and Senate in the realm
of diplomacy came rapidly to assume a close approach to their present
form," he relies on the Jay Treaty as "a prime illustration" of a
treaty negotiated "under instructions in the framing of which the
Senate had no hand ... .'' 74 At this time, the Federalists were in
control of the Senate, and four Federalists, Oliver Ellsworth, George
Cabot, Caleb Strong and Rufus King "were the backbone of the
administration party in the Senate" and "dominated the entire proceeding." They suggested both the mission and the plenipotentiary
to Washington, and then pressed Chief Justice John Jay to accept
the post.7is In effect, the Senate acted "through a small number of
its members in whom both the executive and a majority of their colleagues had great confidence." In instructing the envoy, "the Senatorial group still exercised a powerful if not a predominant influence.''76 As Hayden observed: "The entire procedure, certainly, is
very similar to that by which it later became customary to consult
the Senate through the Committee on Foreign Relations before any
important negotiation was embarked upon.'' 77

D. Marshall's "Sole Organ" of Foreign Relations
One of the other pillars of the claimed presidential monopoly of
foreign relations is John Marshall's famed statement in 1799 that
"[t]he President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations."78 Upon this statement Justice Sutherland uncritically relied
72. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 760 (1796).
73. Id. at 760-61. For a discussion of the incident, see Berger, Executive Privilege
v. Congressional Inquiry, 12 UCLA L. REv. 1043, 1085-86 (1965) [hereinafter :Berger,
Privilege].
74. CoRWIN, THE PRFSIDENT, supra note 6, at 257.
75. R. HAYDEN, supra note 23, at 63, 65, 67, 92.
76. Id. at 71, 72. Cf. id. at 92.
77. Id. at 73.
78. 10 ANNALS OF CoNG. 613 (1800).
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in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,19 and it was later
cited by Justice Douglas in United States v. Pink.Bo Thus emboldened by "that arch constitutional conservative"B1-Justice Sutherland, McDougal and Lans concluded that Marshall "indicated the
constitutional basis for the consummation of direct Presidential [executive] agreements,"B 2 from which the Senate was excluded. So it
is that uncritical repetition of a statement torn from its context has
raised it to the level of dogma.
Marshall spoke in the House of Representatives to the extradition of one Jonathan Robbins, charged with murder by Great Britain
and surrendered to the British authorities without judicial hearing
upon the order of President John Adams, who acted under an existing treaty.Ba Adams was under attack on the ground that the matter
of surrender was for the courts, not the President. Patently, the participation of the Senate in treaty negotiations or in any other facet
of foreign affairs was not remotely involved. The Robbins affair,
replied Marshall, involved "a national demand made upon the nation" and was therefore
not a case for judicial cognizance . . . . The President is the sole
organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations. Of consequence, the demand of a foreign
nation can only be made on him.
He is charged to execute the laws. A treaty is declared to be a
law. He must then execute a treaty ....
Ought not [the President] to perform the object, although the
particular mode of using the means has not been prescribed? Congress, unquestionably, may prescribe the mode, and Congress may
devolve on others the whole execution of the contract; but, till this
be done, it seems the duty of the Executive department, to execute
the contract by any means it possesses.B4
79. 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
80. 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942).
81. McDougal & Lans, supra note 5, at 255.
82. Id. at 249-50.
83. CoRWIN, CONTROL, supra note 28, at 99.
84. 10 ANNALS OF CoNG. 613-14 (emphasis added). In his influential The President's Control of Foreign Relations, Corwin stated that the "President is the organ of
diplomatic intercourse ••• first, because of his powers in connection with the reception
and dispatch of diplomatic agents and with treaty-making; secondly, because of the
tradition of executive power adherent to his office." CORWIN, CONTROL, supra note 28,
at 33. It follows, he stated, that "this power is presumptively his alone," id. at 35,
and from this he glided into the "necessity of preserving to the President his full constitutional discretion in the conduct of our foreign relations." Id. at 37. But the power
to "receive" ambassadors, Hamilton explained, was "without consequence," "more a
matter of dignity than of authority." See text accompanying note 21 supra. And the
treaty power requires Senate participation all along the way. See text accompanying
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Corwin justly concluded, "Clearly, what Marshall had foremost in
mind was simply the President's role as instrument of communication with other governments." 85 Stripped of later interpretive encrustations, Marshall merely affirmed that a demand for extradition
under a treaty "can only be made upon" the President; and that he
is free to fashion his own means of complying with the treaty and
demand until Congress "prescribes the mode." Far from excluding
Congress from this "sole organ" area, therefore, Marshall regarded
the exercise of even this power as subject to congressional control.

E. Hamilton's Later Views
Corwin attributes the expansion of the "President's external
role ... in the first instance" to Hamilton, through the medium
of his "Pacificus" papers in 1793.86 Madison entered the lists under
the nom de plume "Helvidius"; and John Quincy Adams remarked
in 1836 that Madison "scrutinized the doctrines of Pacificus with an
acuteness of intellect never perhaps surpassed," and that his "most
forcible arguments are pointed with quotations from the papers of
The Federalist written by Mr. Hamilton." 87 But "history," said
Corwin, "has awarded the palm of victory to 'Pacificus,' " meaning
that "[b]y his reading of the 'executive power' clause 'Pacificus' gave
the President constitutional warrant to go ahead and apply the advantages of his position in a field of power to which they are specially
adapted." 88 That "Pacificus'" views were congenial to presidential
note 55 supra. No "tradition of executive power" can diminish the constitutional
provisions nor defeat the intention of the Founders.
Corwin, id. at 39, likewise relied on a Marshall dictum in Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165-66 (1803), to bolster the "discretion" of the President "as
the organ of communication." Marshall pointed to the act of Congress for establishing
the department of foreign affairs, and said of the Secretary, "This officer, as his duties
were prescribed by that act, is to conform precisely to the will of the President."
(Emphasis added.) It was the President's statutory control of the Secretary in the
frame of judicial review that was under discussion, not his total freedom from con•
gressional control. Congress could of course repeal the act; it could not permanently
abdicate the powers confided to it, as Corwin himself noted. CoRWIN, THE PRESIDENT,
supra note 6, at 9. And as we noted, Marshall himself recognized the overriding power
of Congress even with respect to the President's sole power of communication.
85. CoRWIN, THE PRESIDENT, supra note 6, at 216 (emphasis original). Earlier,
CoRWIN, CoNTRoL, supra note 28, at 102, he took exception to Marshall's assertion that
"Congress may unquestionably prescribe the mode • • • ." But if the Marshall
statement is to undergird presidential claims, it must be read entire, limited as
Marshall confined it. Corwin recognizes that by Act of Congress, "complaints for
extradition may be lodged with any court of record," but maintains that "the final act
of surrender still rests with the discretion of the President." CORWIN, CoNTRoL, supra,
at 103. That exclusive enclave is small indeed.
86. CoRWIN, THE PRESIDENT, supra note 6, at 217.
87. Id. at 219, 466 n.34, quoting J.Q• .ADAMS, EULOGY ON JAMES MADISON 46 (1836).
88. CORWIN, TOTAL WAR, supra note 5, at 12.
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expansionism is hardly deniable; but whether they afforded a "constitutional warrant" must tum on the validity of his arguments
rather than their subsequent adoption by Presidents whose purposes
they served. For, as Lord Justice Denman stated, "the mere statement and restatement of a doctrine ... cannot make it law, unless it
can be traced to some competent authority." 89 The magic of Hamilton's name must not obscure the fact that he had executed a volte/ace, repudiating assurances he had made both in The Federalist and
in the New York Ratification Convention to procure adoption of the
Constitution.
To still objections to the exclusive presidential power to "receive
Ambassadors"-the sole foreign affairs power confided to the President alone-Hamilton had earlier assured the people that it "is
more a matter of dignity than of authority . . . without consequence."90 Now, as "Pacificus," he transformed this innocuous
"dignity" into "the right of the executive to decide upon the obligations of the country with regard to foreign nations," so that had there
been an "ofjensive and defensive" treaty with France, presidential
recognition "of the new government ... would have laid the Legislature under an obligation ... of exercising its power of declaring
war." 91 The "story as a whole," Corwin observes, "only emphasizes
the essential truth of 'Helvidius' ' contention that 'Pacificus' ' reading of the executive power clause contravened, certainly in effect,
the express intention of the Constitution that the war-declaring
power [plus discretion when to exercise it] should lodge with the
legislative authority." 92
Hamilton also built upon the contrast between Article I, which
provides that "all legislative powers herein granted shall be vested
in a Congress," and Article II, which declares that "the Executive
89. O'Connell v. Regina, 8 Eng. Rep. 1061, 1143 (1844). Maitland too stated that
"some statement about the 13th century does not become true because it has been
constantly repeated, that a 'chain of testimony' is never stronger than its first link."
Quoted in C. FIFOOT, FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND: A LIFE 11 (1971).
90. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
91. 4 A. HAMILTON, THE WORKS OF Af.EXANDER HAMILTON 442 (H. Lodge ed. 1904)
(emphasis original). With good reason, therefore, did Madison say that the reception
clause merely provided "for a particular mode of communication ••• for the ceremony
of admitting public ministers, of examining their credentials, and of authenticating
their title," so that "it would be highly improper to magnify the function into an important prerogative •.••" 6 J. MADISON, THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 162 (G. Hunt
ed. 1906). "So visionary a prophet,'' said Madison, as would have foretold in 1788
that Hamilton would in 1793 elevate an admittedly inconsequential power to that of
imposing on Congress an obligation to declare war, would not have been believed. Id.
at 162-63.
92. CORWIN, TOTAL WAR, supra note 5, at 14. See generally Berger, War-Making,
supra note 17.
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power shall be vested in a President," brushing aside the enumeration of specific presidential powers that followed as not "derogating
from the more comprehensive grant in the general clause." 93 Although the vast bulk of powers granted by the Constitution are conferred upon Congress, it is the President, according to Hamilton,
who emerges with all but unlimited power.
His view is refuted by the historical record. The colonial period,
Corwin said, "ended with the belief prevalent that 'the executive
magistracy' was the natural enemy, the legislative assembly the natural friend of liberty .... " 94' In considerable part, this belief was an
outgrowth of the fact that assemblies were elected by the colonists
themselves whereas the governors were placed over them by the
King. 911 In "most of the early state constitutions accordingly we find
the gubernatorial office reduced almost to the dimensions of a symbol," with all roots in the royal prerogative cut.96 Charles Warren
thought it
probable that Madison and Randolph in preparing the Virginia
Plan had in mind the conception of Executive power which Thomas
Jefferson had set forth in his Draft of a Fundamental Constitution
for Virginia in 1783, as follows: ". . . . By Executive powers, we
mean no reference to those powers exercised under our former government by the Crown as of its prerogative .... We give them these
powers only, which are necessary to execute the laws (and administer
the government) ...."97
The Virginia Plan, submitted to the Convention by Governor
Edmund Randolph, proposed a "national executive ... with power·
93. 4 A. HAMILTON, supra note 91, at 438-39. For materials tracing the path to
the words "executive power" see Berger, Privilege, supra note 73, at 1072-73.
94. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, supra note 6, at 4. Those who fashioned the States, said
Madison, "seem never for a moment to have turned their eyes from the danger to
liberty from the overgrown and all-grasping prerogative of an hereditary magistrate."
THE FEDERALisr No. 48, supra note 21, at 322.
95. I J. WILSON, THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 292-93 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967).
96. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, supra note 6, at 4-5. For example, the Virginia Constitution of 1776 provides that the Governor shall "exercise the executive powers of
government, according to the laws of this Commonwealth, and shall not, under any
pretence, exercise any power or prerogative, by virtue of any law, statute, or custom
of England." 2 B. POORE, FEDERAL AND STATE CoNsrrrUTIONS 1910-11 (1877). Section 33
of the Maryland Constitution of 1776 is almost identical. I B. PooRE, supra, at 825.
CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, supra note 6, at 5, justifiably concludes that under the preConvention state constitutions, "Executive power ••• was cut off entirely from the
resources of the common law and of English constitutional usage." In the Convention,
James 'Wilson stated that he "did not consider the Prerogatives of the British monarch
as a proper guide in defining the Executive powers." I M. FARRAND, supra note 30, at
65-66. Hamilton emphasized in THE FEDERALisr No. 69, supra note 21, at 448, that the
President's authority as Commander in Chief would be "much inferior" to that of the
British King. See also note Ill infra.
97. C. WARREN, THE MAK.ING OF THE CoNsrlTUTION 177 (1947).
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to carry into execution the national laws-to appoint to offices, in
cases not otherwise provided for ...." 98 Roger Sherman "considered
the Executive magistracy as nothing more than an institution for
carrying the will of the Legislature into effect . . . .'' 99 Although
James Wilson was the "leader of the 'strong executive' party," 100 the
"only powers he conceived strictly Executive were those of executing the laws, and appointing officers . . . ."101 Madison emphasized
that preliminarily it was essential "to fix the extent of the Executive
authority ... as certain powers were in their nature Executive, and
must be given to that department ... .'' And he added that the executive powers "shd. be confined and defined.'' 102 Thereafter, the enumerated powers were slowly added.1° 8
The explanation of executive power to the Ratifying Conventions reaffirmed these views. The executive powers were "precisely
those of the governors," said James Bowdoin in Massachusetts, as did
James Iredell in North Carolina.104 "What are his powers?" said
Governor Randolph in Virginia. "To see the laws executed. Every
executive in America has that power.'' 105 In Pennsylvania, James
Wilson, in order to defend the President against the charge that he
"will be the tool of the Senate," pointed first to the fact that he was
to be Commander in Chief, and then added, "There is another power
of no small magnitude intrusted to this officer. 'He shall take care
that the laws be faithfully executed.' " 106 Iredell likewise stressed
that the "office of superintending the execution of the laws ... is
... of the utmost importance";107 and this was likewise the view
expressed in North Carolina by Archibald Maclaine.108 Charles
Pinckney, a Framer, said in South Carolina that "[h]is duties, will
98. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 30, at 62-63. For approval by the Convention on
July 17th, see 2 id. at 32-33.
99. 1 id. at 65.
100. CORWIN, Tm: PRl1.SIDENT, supra note 6, at 11.
101. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 30, at 66.
102. 1 id. at 66-67 (emphasis added). King's notes recorded: "Mad: agrees with
Wilson in his definition of executive powers-executive powers ex vi termini, do not
include the Rights of war and peace, &:c. but the powers shd. be confined and definedif large we shall have the Evils of elective Monarchies ••••" Id. at 70. See also Berger,
Privilege, supra note 73, at 1071-75.
103. Cf. CORWIN, THE PRl1.SIDENT, supra note 6, at 11-12.
104. 2 J. ELLIOT, supra note 30, at 128; 4 id. at 107. For the governors' powers, see
note 96 supra and accompanying text.
105. 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 30, at 201.
106. 2 id. at 512-13.
107. 4 id. 106, 136.
108. Id. at 136.
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be, to attend to the execution of the acts of Congress";109 and, to
ward off fears of "the dangers of the executive," Pinckney stressed
that the President cannot "take a single step in his government,
without [Senate] advice."110 Another Framer, William Davie, told
the North Carolina Convention that "that jealousy of executive
power which has shown itself so strongly in all American governments, would not admit" of lodging the treaty powers in the President alone.111
Hamilton's own representations in the several numbers of The
Federalist devoted to analysis of presidential powers did not part
company with the Framers. Public sentiment would not permit it.
"Calculating upon the aversion of the people to monarchy," he
wrote, opponents of the Constitution "have endeavoured to enlist
all their jealousies and apprehensions in opposition to the intended
President ... as the full-grown progeny of that detested parent."112
To counter such fears, he launched upon a minute analysis of each
of the enumerated powers; for example, the Commander in Chief
was merely to be the "first General."113 Nothing was "to be feared,"
from an executive "with the confined authorities" of the President.114
And after thus enumerating several powers, Hamilton stated:
The only remaining powers of the Executive are comprehended in
giving information to Congress of the state of the Union; in recommending to their consideration such measures as he shall judge expedient; in convening them, or either branch, upon extraordinary
occasions; in adjourning them when they cannot themselves agree
upon the time of adjournment; in receiving ambassadors and other
public ministers; in faithfully executing the laws; and in commissioning all the officers of the United States.115

When "Paci.ficus" shifted gears, he too lightly dismissed the effect
of the enumeration of powers; for the Founders were repeatedly
assured that there was little risk of oppression under "a government
consisting of enumerated powers."116 Governor Randolph said in the
109. 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 30, at 111.
110. 4 J. Er.uoT, supra note 30, at 258.
111. Id. at 120. "Fear of a return of Executive authority like that exercised by the
Royal Governors or by the King had been ever present in the states from the beginning
of the Revolution." C. WARREN, supra note 97, at 173.
112. THE FEDERALIST No. 67, supra note 21, at 436.
113. THE FEDERALisr No. 69, id. at 448.
114. THE FEDERALIST No. 71, id. at 468.
115. THE FEDERALIST No. 77, id. at 501 (emphasis added).
116. James Wilson in 2 J. EWOT, supra note 30, at 436.
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Virginia Convention that the powers of government "are enumerated. Is it not, then, fairly deductible, that it has no power but what
is expressly given it?-for if its powers were to be general, an enumeration would be needless." 117 James Iredell told the North Carolina Convention, "It is necessary to particularize the powers intended
to be given, in the Constitution, as having no existence before; but,
after having enumerated what we give up, it follows . . . that whatever is done, by virtue of that authority, is legal ...." 118 It will be
recalled that Madison stated in the Federal Convention that it was
essential "to fix the extent of the Executive authority" and to give
"certain powers" to the executive, and that the executive power
should be "confined and defined." 119 The Federalist itself, per Madison, emphasized in No. 14 that the jurisdiction of the federal government "is limited to certain enumerated objects,"120 and in No.
45 that "[t]he powers delegated ... to the federal government are
few and defined.''121 What Lee said in Virginia of Congress could
equally have been said of the President: "[T]he liberties of the
people are secure. . . . When a question arises with respect to the
legality of any power, exercised or assumed by Congress [the question will be] ... Is it enumerated in the Constitution? . • . It is
otherwise arbitrary and unconstitutional.'' 122
These were not the only departures by "Pacificus" from Hamilton's prior representations. Having erected a plenary executive
power, "Pacificus" proceeded to whittle down "participation of the
Senate in the making of treaties, and the power of the legislature to
declare war" because "as exceptions out of the general 'executive
power' vested in the President, they are to be construed strictly
• • • .'' 123 Not only does this run counter to the last-minute joinder
of the President as a participant in the treaty power, but Hamilton
117. 3 id. at 464.
118. 4 id. at 179. Chief Justice Taney pointed out how "carefully" the Framers
withheld from the executive branch "many of the powers belonging to the executive
English government ••• and conferred ••• those powers only which were deemed
essential." Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 149 (No. 9487) (C.C. Md. 1861). So too,
Story stated that the powers with which the executive branch "is entrusted ••• are
enumerated in the second and third sections ••••" 2 J. STORY, CoMMENTAIUES ON THE
CoNSTlTUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1489, at 327 (5th ed. 1891).
119. See text accompanying note 102 supra.
120. THE FEDERALisr No. 14, supra note 21, at 82.
121. THE FEDERALisr No. 45, id. at 303. For additional citations, see BERGER, CONGRESS, supra note 32, at 13-14, 377 n.52.
122. 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 30, at 186 (emphasis original). Iredell said of the Supremacy Clause in the North Carolina Convention, "[f]he question ••• will always
be, whether Congress had exceeded its authority." 4 id. at 179.
123. 4 A. HAMILTON, supra note 91, at 443.
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himself had stated in The Federalist No. 75 that the treaty power
"partake[s] more of the legislative than of the executive character,
though it does not seem strictly to fall within the definition of either
of them." 12t Wilson and Madison stated in the Convention that
some of the King's prerogatives "were of a Legislative nature. Among
others that of war & peace"; and consequently those prerogatives
were not "a proper guide in defining the Executive powers." The
"only powers" they considered "strictly Executive were those of
executing the laws, and appointing officers not appointed by the
Legislature." 125 Later, Wilson stated that in the distribution of war
powers all of the powers "naturally connected" with Congress' power
to "declare war" were confided to it, leaving to the President only
the direction of the armed forces once war was commenced by Congress or by foreign invasion.126 If there was an "exception," it ran
the other way, from the plenary war-making power of Congress
for the executive £unction of "first General." So too, the treaty power,
which was lodged in the Senate almost to the end of the Convention,
and only then altered to admit presidential participation, hardly
reflects a view that it is executive in nature. 127
124. THE FEDERALisr No. 75, supra note 21, at 486.
125. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 30, at 65-66, 70.
126. 1 J. WILSON, supra note 95, at 433, 440. For extended discussion, see generally
Berger, War-Making, supra note 17.
127. In his "Helvidius" papers, Madison reasons,
The natural province of the executive magistrate is to execute laws, as that of
the legislature is to make laws. All his acts, therefore, properly executive, must
presuppose the existence of laws to be executed. A treaty is not an execution of
laws: it does not presuppose the existence of laws. It is, on the contrary, to have
itself the force of a law, and to be carried into execution, like all other laws,
by the executive magistrate. To say that the power of making treaties, which
are confessedly laws, belongs naturally to the department which is to execute it,
is to say that the executive department naturally includes a legislative power.
In theory this is an absurdity-in practice a tyranny.
6 J. MADISON, supra note 91, at 145 (emphasis original). After serving as Secretary of
State, Vice President Jefferson wrote in his MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRAGrICE § 52,
at 109 (Clark, Austin &: Smith ed. 1856): "Treaties are legislative acts."
Corwin considers that Madison's view is inconsistent with his position during the
"removal" debate in 1789. CORWIN, CONTROL, supra note 28, at 28-29. If Madison's
1789 views were inconsistent with the views he later expressed, the latter were consistent with the statements that are an index to construction of the Constitution. See
BERGER, CONGRESS, supra note 32, at 76-81.
Then too, the issues were entirely different. The Constitution made no provision
for removal from office, and there was no explanation by the Framers. Hence when
Madison and others argued that the power ought to be in the Executive, they contradicted neither the express terms of the Constitution nor its history. Hamilton,
however, did contradict the evident assumption writ large in the text that "the President and the Senate will be associated throughout the entire process of making a treaty
... .'' See text accompanying note 29 supra. And in his subsequent Letters of Camillus,
Hamilton stated that because of the "most ample latitude" of the treaty power "it was
carefully guarded; the cooperation of • • • the Senate . • • being required to make any
treaty whatever." 6 A. HAMILTON, supra note 91, at 183.
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After his "Pacificus" papers, Hamilton wrote in his Letters of
Camillus that "the organization of the power of treaty in the Constitution was attacked and defended with an admission on both
sides, of its being of the [legislative] character which I have assigned
to it. Its great extent and importance . . . the legislative authority
were mutually taken for granted ...." 128
Of course, Hamilton was free to change his mind from time to
time; but the meaning of the Constitution, as Jefferson stressed, is
"to be found in the explanations of those who advocated it," upon
which the people relied in adopting the Constitution.128 Until the
people are given the chance to say whether they have changed their
minds, Hamilton's shift can furnish no "constitutional warrant" for
an unconfined executive power.
"Pacificus' " view that the general executive power was not restricted by the specifically enumerated powers that followed was
embraced by Chief Justice Taft in Myers v. United States180 over the
dissents of Justices Holmes131 and Brandeis,132 who gave short shrift
to the executive power argument.133 Not Taft's views, but those of
Holmes and Brandeis subsequently prevailed with Justices Black,
Douglas, Frankfurter and Jackson in Youngstown Sheet b Tube Co.
v. Sawyer. 134 Justice Jackson rejected the view that the executive
power clause "is a grant in bulk of all conceivable executive power
but regard[ed] it as an allocation to the presidential office of the
generic powers thereafter stated."135 Which view the newly recon128. 6 A. HAMILTON, supra note 91, at 185. In this letter Hamilton cited the dissent
of George Mason from the Constitution on the ground that "[b)y declaring all treaties
supreme laws of the land, the Executive and Senate have, in many cases, an exclusive
power of legislation • • • ."; and he comments, "This shows the great extent of the
power, in the conception of Mr. Mason: in many cases amounting to an exclusive power
of legislation: nor did he object to the ex.tent ••••" Id. at 184 (emphasis original).
129. Quoted in 4 J. ELLIOT, supra note 30, at 446. So too, Madison clung "to the
sense in which the Constitution was accepted and ratified by the Nation •••• And if
that be not the guide in ex.pounding it, there can be no security for a consistent and
stable government, more than for a faithful exercise of its powers." 9 J. MADISON,
supra note 91, at 191.
130. 272 U.S. 52, 118, 128 (1925).
131. 272 U.S. at 177.
132. 272 U.S. at 244-47.
133. For a discussion, see Berger, Privilege, supra note 73, at 1073-76. McDougal &:
Lans, supra note 5, at 252, rely on Myers for the "construction of the first clause of
Article II as a broad grant of residual power to the executive." See also McDougal &:
Lans, supra, at 295. In his 1953 edition of the Constitution, supra note 1, at 379,
Corwin stated, "These enlarged conceptions of the executive power clause have been
ratified by the Supreme Court" in the Myers case.
134. 343 U.S. 579, 587 (Black, J.), 610 (Frankfurter, J.), 641 (Jackson, J.) (1952).
Justice Douglas stated: "Article II which vests the 'executive Power' in the President
defines that power with particularity." 343 U.S. at 632.
135. 343 U.S. at 641.
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structed Burger Court may opt for is an open question; but it cannot
rewrite history. And it is the unmistakable lesson of history that the
President was intentionally given a few enumerated powers, no more.

F.

The 1816 Senate Report

Another hardy perennial frequently drawn forth in defense of
presidential monopoly-by Justice Sutherland136 and Dean Acheson137 among others-is an 1816 Report by the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, which counseled against "interference of the
Senate in the direction of foreign negotiations." 138 This warning was
based on notions of expediency, as to which men may differ, rather
than upon the historical content of the treaty power. Opposed to this
Report is a Senate debate in 1806, which discloses that the Senate
then "believed that, constitutionally, it possessed authority to participate in treaty-making at any stage in the process,"139 a belief later
shared by Secretary of State Buchanan and President Polk. 140 A more
important episode is the statement in the Senate by Senator Rufus
King in 1818. King had been a member of the Continental Congress,
of the Federal Convention where, as a member of the Committee on
Detail, he helped draft the final provision for presidential participation in treaty-making, of the Massachusetts Ratification Convention, and of the Senate quadrumvirate, which piloted the Jay Treaty
from beginning to end. Said King,
[I]n respect to foreign affairs, the President has no exclusive binding
power, except that of receiving Ambassadors . . • . [T]o the validity
of all other definitive proceedings in the management of the foreign
affairs, the Constitutional advice and consent of the Senate are indispensable ..•. [I]n this capacity the Senate may, and ought to, look
into and watch over every branch of the foreign affairs . . . they
may, therefore, at any time call for full and exact information respecting the foreign affairs .... To make a treaty includes all the
proceedings by which it is made; and the advice and consent of the
Senate being necessary in the making of treaties, must necessarily be
so, touching the measures employed in making the same.141

King rejected the gloss "that the President shall make treaties, and
136, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936). See text
accompanying note 19 supra.
137, Hearings, supra note 13, at 260. The Report was also cited by Assistant Attorney General William H. Rehnquist, id. at 431.
138. Quoted in 299 U.S. at 319; Hearings, supra note 13, at 260.
139. R. HAYDEN, supra note 23, at 203, 199-203.
140. See Black, supra note 70, at 7-8.
141, 31 ANNALS OF CONG. 106-07 (1818).
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by and with the consent of the Senate ratify the same."142 Great
weight attaches to his explanation, not merely because "he was
there," but because it faithfully corresponds to the view that was
taken of the treaty power by the Framers, the Ratifiers, and by
President Washington.
G.

United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation:
Inherent Presidential Power

It remained for our time to furnish a powerful impetus to presidential expansionism in the shape of some ill-considered dicta in
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, per Justice
Sutherland,143 to which the Court lent credit in United States v.
Pink.144 Despite searching criticism,145 Curtiss-Wright has become
the foundation of subsequent decisions and has all too frequently
been cited for an omnipresent presidential power over foreign relations. The case proceeded from a Joint Resolution which authorized
the President, upon making certain findings and engaging in consultations with other American Republics, to declare unlawful the
sale of munitions to countries then engaged in armed conflict in the
Chaco, namely Bolivia and Paraguay, if it "may contribute to the
reestablishment of peace between those countries."146 The sole issue
was whether this was an improper delegation,147 a question that
might adequately have been answered under the Field v. Clark148
line of cases. But the aims of Justice Sutherland soared beyond this
modest goal; he would launch a theory of inherent presidential
power over foreign relations.149 To this end he confined the enumeration of powers doctrine to "domestic or internal affairs"; 150 in for142. Id. Compare text accompanying notes 22-23 supra.
143. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
144. 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942). The Curtiss-Wright dicta were brushed aside in
Youngstown Sheet &: Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-36 &: n.2 (1952), by Justice
Jackson, who pointed out that Curtiss-Wright "involved, not the question of the President's power to act without congressional authority, but the question of his right to
act under and in accord with an act of Congress." (Concurring opinion.)
145. See note 180 infra. See also Kurland, The Impotence of Reticence, 1968 DUKE
L.J. 619, 622-23.
146. 299 U.S. at 312.
147. 299 U.S. at 315.
148. 143 U.S. 649 (1892). See also J. W. Hampton, Jr.,&: Co. v. United States, 276 U.S.
394 (1928). The cases are well analyzed in W. GELLHORN &: C. BYSE, ADMINismATIVE
LAw: CASES AND COMMENTS 48-52 (5th ed. 1970).
149. As late as 1929, Willoughby wrote, "There can be no question as to the unconstitutional unsoundness, as well as the revolutionary character of the theory" of
inherent powers. 1 w. WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
92 (2d ed. 1929).
150. 299 U.S. at 315-16.
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eign affairs, he explained, in terms recalling the descent of the Holy
Ghost, "the external sovereignty of Great Britain . . . immediately
passed to the Union."151 In this he was deceived. It hardly needs
more than Madison's statement in The Federalist No. 45, that "[t]he
powers delegated by the proposed Constitution are few and defined
. . . [they] will be exercised principally on external objects, as war,
peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce,''152 to prove that the powers over foreign relations were enumerated and "defined." Deferring
for the moment further comment on Sutherland's aberrant theory,
let it be assumed that somehow the nation or Union obtained "inherent" powers over foreign relations, and it still needs to be shown
how the power came to be vested in the President. For, as Justice
Frankfurter pointed out, "the fact that power exists in the Government does not vest it in the President."153 The "inherent power"
theory, moreover, would circumvent the manifest intention of the
Framers to create a federal government of limited and enumerated
powers and defeat their purpose to condition presidential action in
the field of foreign relations on congressional participation. Before
examining the history Sutherland avouched, another ground of his
opinion should be noticed: the "plenary and exclusive power of the
President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of
international relations," for which he trotted out Marshall's "sole
organ" dictum and the Senate Committee Report of 1816,154 earlier
discussed.
McDougal and Lans, who relied heavily on these dicta,m acknowledged that Sutherland's analysis "unquestionably involves certain metaphorical elements and considerable differences of opinion
about historical facts," but concluded that he "may have been expressing a thought more profound than any involved in quarrels
about the naming of powers." 156 This is to conclude that Sutherland was right for the wrong reasons. Apparently the "profound"
thought was the "important fact ... that the imperatives of survival
151. 299 U.S. at 317.
152. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, supra note 21, at 303 (emphasis added).
153. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 604 (1952) (concurring
opinion).
154. 299 U.S. at 319-20.
155. McDougal & Lans, supra note 5, at 255-58. Dean Acheson, former Secretary
of State, cited Curtiss-Wright to the Senate in July 1971. Hearings, supra note 13, at
260,264.
156. McDougal &: Lans, supra note 5, at 257-58. The Framers, we shall see, would
have no part of his metaphors.
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have required the Federal Government to exercise certain powers." 1157
No "imperatives of survival" were at stake in Curtiss-Wright or in
Pink, nor has there been any demonstration that the powers of the
federal government were and are inadequate, still less how supraconstitutional powers came to rest in the President. Instead, the issue
is whether the President may act without the participation of the
Senate in the exercise of powers conferred on President and Senate
jointly. The "quarrel," therefore, is not about the mere "naming of
powers," but about presidential claims to exclusive power notwithstanding that the Constitution and Founders unmistakably meant
the treaty power to be exercised jointly with the Senate.
It is high time that the mischievous and demonstrably wrong
dicta of Justice Sutherland be put to rest. His view that the President
enjoys extra-constitutional powers outside the sphere of enumerated
powers was based on the theory that
since the states severally never possessed international powers, such
powers could not have been carved from the mass of state powers but
obviously were transmitted to the United States from some other
source . . . • [T]he powers of external sovereignty passed from the
Crown not to the colonies severally, but to the colonies in their collective and corporate capacity as the United States .... Sovereignty
is never held in suspense. When, therefore, the external sovereignty
of Great Britain in respect of the colonies ceased, it immediately
passed to the Union. See Penhallow v. Doane, 3 Dall. 54, 80-81.1158

Seldom have dicta more "obviously" been removed from the historical facts.
To the minds of the colonists, "thirteen sovereignties," as Chief
Justice Jay said in 1793, "were considered as emerged from the principles of the revolution."159 For this we need go no further than the
Articles of Confederation, agreed to by the Continental Congress on
November 5, 1777, signed by all the States save Maryland in 1778
and 1779, and ratified March 1, 1781.160 Article II recited, "Each
state retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every
Power ... which is not ... expressly delegated to the United States
157. Id. This reasoning is followed by Mathews, The Constitutional Power of the
President To Conclude International Agreements, 64 YALE L.J. 345, 348 (1955).
158. 299 U.S. at 316-17.
159. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 470 (1793). The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, art. IV, provided, "The people of this commonwealth have the sole
and exclusive right of governing themselves as a free, sovereign, and independent
State, and do, and forever hereafter shall, exercise and enjoy every power, jurisdiction
and right which is not, or may not hereafter be, by them expressly delegated to the
United States of America in Congress assembled." 1 B. PooRE, supra note 96, at 958,
160. H. CoMMAGER, DOCUl',IENTS OF AMERICAN HISI'ORY Ill (7th ed. 1963).
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in Congress assembled." Article III provided, "The said states hereby
severally enter into a firm league of friendship with each other, for
their common defence ...." Mark that they entered into a "league";
they did not purport to create a "corporate" or "sovereign" body.
Article IX then declared that "[t]he united states in congress assembled shall have the sole and exclusive right of determining on
peace and war ... entering into treaties and alliances." This express
grant of war and treaty powers alone undermines Justice Sutherland's central premise that these powers were derived from "some
other source" than the several States. If the new-horn Continental
Congress possessed "inherent" war and treaty powers from the outset, the express grant was gratuitous.
Nor did the Founders share Justice Sutherland's views on sovereignty. More pragmatic than he, they spoke, not in terms of sovereignty, hut of power; and they were quite clear that the people, not
even the cherished States, were sovereign. Power flowed from the
people, not from the Crown to fill a vacuum. Hear James Iredell
in North Carolina: "It is necessary to particularize the power intended to be given, as having no existence before . . . ." 161 "The
people," stated Madison in the Convention, "were in fact the fountain of all power"; 162 a part they conferred upon the individual
States; and in the clause, "We, the people of the United States ...
do ordain and establish this Constitution," said Chief Justice Jay,
"we see the people acting as sovereign of the whole country."163
Sovereignty was taken by the people to themselves.
When Justice Sutherland cited Penhallow v. Doane,164 he referred solely to the opinion of Justice William Paterson, ignoring
the fact that the majority opinions of Justices Iredell and Cushing
were to the contrary. The case arose on a state of facts that antedated
the adoption of the Articles of Confederation; and Paterson stated
that the Continental Congress exercised the "rights and powers
of war," and that "states individually did not."165 This, however,
does not tell the whole story. For example, the Continental Congress
resolved on November 4, 1775,
161. 4 J. ELLIOT, supra note 30, at 179 (emphasis added).
162. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 30, at 476. For similar remarks by George Mason,
James Iredell, James Wilson, and others, see BERGER, CONGRESS, supra note 32, 173 n.
99, 174-75. With justice, therefore, did Professor P.B. Kurland dismiss Justice Sutherland's "discovery" that "the presidential powers over foreign affairs derived not at all
from the Constitution but rather from the Crown of England." Kurland, supra note
145, at 622, See also note 183 infra.
163. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 471 (1793).
164. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54 (1795).
165. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 80-81.
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[t]hat the town of Charleston ought to be defended against any attempts that may be made to take possession thereof by the enemies of
America, and that the convention or council of safety of South Carolina, ought to pursue such measures, as to them shall seem most efficacious for the purpose, and that they proceed immediately to erect
such fortifications and batteries in or near Charleston, as will best
conduce to promote its security, the expence to be paid by said
Colony.166
Other testimony that each of the Colonies was thought to possess
war-making power is furnished by the July 12, 1776, draft of the
Articles of Confederation: "The said Colonies unite themselves . . .
and hereby severally enter into a firm League of Friendship . . .
binding the said Colonies to assist one another against all Force
offered to or attacks made upon them ...." 167 Indeed, as Justice Chase
was to remark in a cognate case, the very fact of delegation of war
power by the States to the Congress demonstrates that the States must
have "rightfully possessed" it.168 In the course of time, the States
did not "individually" exercise the power of war; but that did not
spring from absence of original power but from a voluntary surrender expressed both in the Article IX delegation and in the 1776
draft of Article XIII: "No colony ... shall engage in any War without the previous Consent of the United States assembled, .. .''169-a
provision that was preserved in Article VI of the Articles as adopted.
Justice James Iredell, whose opinion in Penhallow went unnoticed by Sutherland, understood all this full well. Each province,
he pointed out, had comprised "a body politic," in nowise connected
with the others "than as being subject to the same common sovereign."170 "If congress," he continued, "previous to the articles of
confederation, possessed any authority, it was an authority . . .
derived from the people of each Province .... [T]his authority was
conveyed by each body politic separately, and not by all the people
in the several provinces, or states, jointly ...." 171 And he concluded
that the war-making authority "was not possessed by Congress, unless
given by all the states."172 In this view he was joined by Justice Wil166. 3 JoUR. CoNTL. CoNG. 326 (1775).
167. 5 JoUR. CoNTL. CONG. 546-47 (1776).
168. "Virginia had a right, as a sovereign and independent nation, to confiscate
any British property within its territory, unless she had delegated that power to
Congress . • • . [I]f she had before parted with such power, it must be conceded, that
she once rightfully possessed it." Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 231 (1796).
169. 5 JoUR. CoNTL. CoNG. 549 (1776); H. CoMMAGER, supra note 160, at 112.
170. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 90.
171. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 92-94.
172. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 95.
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liam Cushing; 173 and both are abundantly confirmed by the specific
grants of war and treaty powers to the Congress in the Articles of
Confederation.
Reliance for "inherent" war and treaty powers antedating the
Articles of Confederation has also been placed174 upon some remarks
by Justice Chase in Ware v. Hylton: 175 "The powers of congress
originated from necessity . . . they were revolutionary in their very
nature . . . . It was absolutely and indispensably necessary that
Congress should possess the power of conducting the war against
Great Britain, and therefore, if not expressly given by all, (as it was
by some of the States [who had ratified the Articles in 1778]) ...
Congress did rightfully possess such power." 176 A simpler and more
prosaic explanation is at hand. Sitting and working together,
the delegates from the thirteen States-who as early as July 1776
proposed in the draft Articles of Confederation to reduce to writing
the necessary delegation by the States to Congress and who agreed
to the Articles of Confederation in November 1777-presumably
were agreed that the conduct of the war required centralization and
therefore authorized the necessary "confederated" acts pending formal adoption of the proposed Articles. Roughly that view was taken
by Iredell, one of the great Founders, who led the struggle for adoption of the Constitution in North Carolina.177
The invocation of the treaty signed ·with France by Benjamin
Franklin and his fellow commissioners in February 1778, and ratified by Congress in May,178 little advances the argument for
"inherent" national power. Franklin and the other commissioners
proceeded to France under express instructions to enter into a
treaty with the King of France, carrying with them "letters of
credence" (September 1776), running not from the Congress but
from "The delegates of the United States of New Hampshire,
Massachusetts Bay," and each of the other enumerated States.179
173. Justice Cushing stated: "I have no doubt of the sovereignty of the states,
saving the powers delegated to Congress • . • to carry on, unitedly, the common
defense in the open war ••••" 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 117.
174. McDougal 8: I.ans, supra note 5, at 258.
175. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
176. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 232 (emphasis original).
177. Despite his statement respecting "revolutionary" "necessity," Justice Chase
himself stated in Ware v. Hylton that "all the powers actually exercised by congress,
before (the confederation], were rightfully exercised, on the presumption not to be
controverted, that they were so authorized by the people they represented, by an
express or implied grant ••.•" 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 232.
178. See McDougal 8: Lans, supra note 5, at 258; II JoUR. CoNTL. CONG. 421, 444,
457 (1778).
179. 5 JoUR. CoNTL. CONG. 828, 833 (1776) (emphasis added). McDougal &: Lans,
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Doubtless the delegates from the several States believed themselves
authorized to send Franklin in search of an alliance. The resulting
treaty, it bears emphasis, was concluded with "the thirteen United
States of North America, viz. New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay,"
and so forth,180 scarcely testimony that France thought it was concluding an alliance with a sovereign nation. But give the "revolutionary" central government its widest scope, and it still remains
to ask, what relevance do deeds resulting from revolutionary necessity in the absence of an existing national structure have to a subsequent written document, such as the Articles of Confederation,
which carefully enumerates the powers granted and reserves all
powers not "expressly delegated"?181 John Jay later wrote of the
treaty-making power in The Federalist No. 64 that "it should not be
delegated but ... with such precautions as will afford the highest
security ... .''182
Study of the constitutional records convinces that the Founders
jealously insisted on a federal government of enumerated, strictly
limited powers.188 In creating first Governors, and then the President, they purposely cut all roots to the royal prerogative.184' Not
for them the aureole with which Justice Sutherland endowed the
supra note 5, at 537, therefore say truly that "these early Congresses • • • although
controlling foreign policy, essentially functioned as councils of ambassadorial dele·
gates from a group of federated states • • • ," a statement that undercuts Sutherland's
dictum that the States never had external "sovereignty."
180. 11 JoUR. CoNTL. CoNG. 421 (1778). Sutherland, 299 U.S. at 317, also relied on
Rufus King's remarks in the Convention: "The States were not 'sovereigns' in the
sense contended for by some. They did not possess the peculiar features of sovereignty.
They could not make war, nor peace, nor alliances, nor treaties." 1 M. FARRAND, supra
note 30, at 323. But these remarks are at war with the facts.
Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland's
Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467 (1946), furnishes additional confirmation for rejection of
Sutherland's views. Levitan demonstrates that the Continental "Congress was a committee of safety having as its basic aim the defeat of Great Britain. At no time was
it viewed, nor did it view itself as a governmental organization having legislative
authority." Id. at 483. The "record of events leaves no doubts that treaty-making
power was exercised by the States." Id. at 485. The States did not deem the 1778
Franklin treaty "binding on them, until they had individually ratified the treaty."
Id. at 486. The 1776-1787 history, he concludes, "leaves little room for the acceptance
of Mr. Justice Sutherland's 'inherent' powers, or in fact 'extra-constitutional' powers
theory." Id. at 496.
That so solid a demonstration of the vulnerability of the Sutherland dicta should
not have discouraged further citation is not the least remarkable chapter in the
history of Curtiss-Wright.
181. Articles of Confederation, art. II, quoted in H. CoMMAGER, supra note 160, at
lll.
182. THE FEDERALIST No. 64, supra note 21, at 417.
183. See note 96; text accompanying notes 94-128 supra. For additional citations,
see BERGER, CONGRESS, supra note 32, at 13-14, 377 n.52; Berger, Privilege, supra note
73, at 1075. See also text accompanying note 23 supra.
184. See notes 96-97 supra and accompanying text.
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President's power over foreign relations. That power was no less
circumscribed than the domestic powers as Madison made clear.1 sis
A supraconstitutional "residuum" of powers not granted expressly
or by necessary implication was not only furthest from their
thoughts,186 but avowal of such a "residuum" would have affrighted
them and barred adoption of the Constitution.187 To conjure up an
"inherent" executive power in the teeth of this history is both to
shut our eyes to the historical record and to abort the plainly manifested intention of the Founders to create a federal government of
limited and enumerated powers.
I!.

EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS

A. Evolution
Executive agreements are not mentioned in the Constitution, in
the Constitutional Convention, or in the Ratification Conventions;
indeed the term is of comparatively recent vintage.188 Starting from
a trickle,189 executive agreements made by the President alonewhich can involve large financial, and possibly military commit~
ments 190-have, since 1930, mounted to a flood. Many of these
185. See text accompanying note 152 supra.
186. In his 1791 Lectures, James Wilson, then a Justice of the Supreme Court,
referred to the executive powers granted by the Constitution and to the presidential
veto as "a guard to protect his powers against [the Legislature's] encroachment. Such
powers and such a guard he ought to possess: but a just distribution of the powers
of government requires that he should possess no more." I J. WILSON, supra note 95,
at 319 (emphasis added).
187. As Alexander White of Virginia stated in the First Congress, after insisting
that the federal government must adhere to the limits described in the Constitution:
"This was the ground on which the friends of the Government supported the Constitution • • • • [I]t could not have been supported on any other. If this principle
had not been successfully maintained by its advocates in the convention of the state
from which I come, the Constitution would never have been ratified." 1 ANNAU; OF
CONG. 515 (1789). Cf. BERGER, CONGRESS, supra note 32, at 13-16.
188. "Actually there are few documents which bear the title 'executive agreement.'
••• But this phrase is used by the Department of State as the title of the series of
publications listing important international agreements, negotiated subsequent to
1930, which did not receive Senatorial consent under Article II, Section 2, prior
to ratification." McDougal &: Lans, supra note 5, at 198 n.16.
189. The power was appraised modestly enough in 1917 in CORWIN, CONTROL, supra
note 28, at 125, when he referred to "the President's prerogative in the making of
international compacts of a temporary nature and not demanding enforcement by
the courts," and prophetically stated that it "is likely to become larger before it
begins to shrink."
"Since 1933 there has been a considerable extension in the use of the executive
agreement, and it has been employed for purposes never contemplated by statesmen
or l\Titers before 1930. This movement was accelerated since the Curtiss-Wright
decision in 1937, avowing a wide inherent power of the Federal government to deal
with foreign affairs." Borchard, Treaties and Executive Agreements-A. Reply, 54 YALE
L.J. 616, 649 (1945).
190. Consider, for example the 435 million dollars in credits and assistance promised
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agreements the State Department refuses to reveal even to the
Senate,191 the constitutional participant in the making of international agreements. Even apologists for executive agreements agree
that secret agreements are undesirable and that they should be subject
to debate and the "salutary influence of public opinion." 192
to Portugal in return for a twenty-five month extension of base rights in the Azores. N.Y.
Times, April 3, 1972, at 7, col. I. An editorial in the Times remarks, "the stationing
of American troops abroad and the establishment of military bases ••• can commit
the nation to war in some instances as thoroughly as a treaty of alliance." N.Y. Times,
May I, 1972, at 32, col. I. For secret promises by Admiral Carney to Greece of atomic
support, and a secret agreement governing nonwithdrawal of combat troops stationed
in Europe, see C. SULZBERGER, A LONG Row OF CANDLES 867, 923 (1969).
191. Indeed, a civil servant, apparently an officer or former officer of the State
Department, suggested that "for controversial acts the Senate method may well be
quietly abandoned, and the instruments handled as executive agreements." 1N.
McCLURE, INTERNATIONAL :ExECUTIVE AGREEMENTS 378 (1941).
Professor Philip B. Kurland, Chief Consultant to the Senate Subcommittee on
Separation of Powers, stated before that Committee in an exchange with former
Secretary of State Dean Acheson that "[t]his committee ••• attempted to secure from
the State Department a list, not even the contents, but a list of executive agreements
between this country and foreign countries and the State Department has been unwilling to afford that information to this committee. There are some hundred odd such
agreements, the contents of which I think are unknown." Hearings, supra note 13, at
268. See also statement of Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., Washington Post, April 25, 1972,
at A-7, col. I. An editorial in the New York Times, May 1, 1972, at 32, col. 1, states:
The tendency of Presidents to circumvent the Constitutional requirement for
Senate approval of treaties by concluding executive agreements has reached
extraordinary proportions in recent years. In the 150 years prior to 1939, the
United States entered into 799 treaties and 1,182 executive agreements, one-andone-half times as many. In the last 26 years, according to State Department compilations, 368 treaties have been concluded but fifteen times that many executive
agreements have been signed-a total of 5,590. In addition, there are over 400
secret agreements, the nature of which the State Department declines to reveal.
Moreover, thousands of other executive agreements evidently have been concluded by other governmental agencies, particularly the Defense Department,
which reportedly refuses to disclose the details even to Congressional Committees.
Former Secretary of Defense, Clark Clifford, testified before the Senate that executive
agreements lead "to excessive secrecy in policy-making, and [they] can lead to implied
national commitments to other nations •.•." Washington Post, April 25, 1972, at A-7,
col. 3.
192. In the course of vigorous advocacy of executive agreements, McDougal and Lans
stated: "No one believes that secret agreements-except to the extent necessitated by
war-time exigencies-are desirable, ••• debate in the House of Representatives can
only be an additional safegnard and provide public education of the highest value."
McDougal &: Lans, supra note 5, at 552-53. "In any situation," they said, "reference of
an important international agreement to Congress has the undoubted advantage of
stimulating public discussion of the issues involved and permits the Executive's judgment to be questioned and checked by independent critics ••••" Id. at 555-56. Former
Secretary of State Dean Acheson testified that "in most cases a legislative agreement
would be better. You bring the House in and you have a much broader basis of
support." He related that when he proposed that the UNNRA relief agreement should
be an executive agreement, Senator Arthur Vandenberg exploded and "the State
Department was scared off." Hearings, supra note 13, at 268. As "a rule, international
agreements, as well as treaties, should be entered i,;ito only in such a way that the
salutary influence of public opinion can be brought to bear on them; the country
should not, as a rule, be bound by stipulations of executive agreements without its
knowledge and without opportunity to protest." J. MATHEWS, AMERICAN FOREIGN
RELATIONS: CONDUcr AND POLICIES 545-46 (1938).
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Roused by this state of affairs, the Senate has recently moved to
limit presidential circumvention of legislative prerogative by requiring that executive agreements be submitted for information,
and is also considering legislation that would confirm Senate power
to veto executive agreements. 193 Since executive agreements are said
to spring from the President's independent powers,194 it is necessary
to investigate the premise on which such a theory rests and whether
the bills presently before Congress invade an area exclusively entrusted to the President.195
Article II, section 2, of the Constitution provides that the President "shall have power, by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, to make Treaties ..•." At the adoption of the Constitution, the word "treaties" had a broad connotation; in the words of
Nicholas Bailey's (1729) dictionary, a treaty was "an agreement
between two or more distinct Nations concerning Peace, Commerce,
Navigation, etc." Hamilton construed "treaty" in the broadest terms:
[F]rom the best opportunity of knowing the fact, 1 aver, that it was
understood by all to be the intent of the provision to give that
power the most ample latitude-to render it competent to all the
stipulations which the exigencies of national affairs might require;
competent to the making of treaties of alliance, treaties of commerce,
treaties of peace, and every other species of convention usual among
nations .... And it was emphatically for this reason that it was so
carefully guarded; the cooperation of two-thirds of the Senate, with
the President, being required to make any treaty whatever.196
Those indefatigable advocates of executive agreements,
McDougal and Lans,197 state that "there are no significant criteria,
193. See text accompanying notes 9-11 supra.
194. McDougal & Lans, supra note 5, at 199. Cf. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203,
229 (1942).
195. The discussion will be confined to the legality of an executive agreement as
a matter of internal Jaw, i.e., its constitutional status. Its legal effect as a matter of
international law, e.g., whether a foreign nation is entitled to rely on an "unauthorized"
executive agreement, is a separate question which is not here considered.
196. Letters of Camillus, in 6 A. HAMILTON, supra note 91, at 183 (emphasis
original). Compare Story's restatement: "The power 'to make treaties' ••• embraces
all sorts of treaties, for peace or war; for commerce or territory; for alliance or succors;
for indemnity for injuries or payment of debts; for the recognition and enforcement
of principles of public law; and for any other purposes, which the policy or interests
of independent sovereigns may dictate in their intercourse with each other." 2 J. STORY,
supra note 118, § 1508, at 338-39. The Hamilton-Story view is reflected in Geofroy v. Riggs,
133 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1890): "That the treaty power ••• extends to all proper subjects
of negotiation between our government and the government of other nations, is
clear •••• It is not perceived that there is any limit to the questions which can be
adjusted" subject to constitutional limitations.
197. Their article, supra note 5, runs to some 250 pages, the bulk of which is
devoted to a plea for agreements fashioned by the President with the approval of a
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under the Constitution . . . or in the diplomatic practice of this
government, by which the genus 'treaty' can be distinguished from
the genus 'executive agreement' other than the single criterion of the
procedure or authority by which the United States' consent to
ratification [by the Senate] is obtained.''198 It follows that the express
provision for treaty-making by the Senate and President jointlywhich embraces "all the stipulations which ... national affairs might
require . . . and every other species of convention"--covers the
field,199 and therefore, as Justice Jackson stated in the Youngstown
case, the presidential claim to power is "clearly eliminated.''200 On
the historical facts, the question, in the words of Professor Philip
Kurland, is, "Should the Constitution really be read to mean that
majority of both Senate and House, as distinguished from consent by two thirds of
the Senate alone. But they break more than one lance for the solo presidential agreement. Id. at 205, 223, 247-51, 311, 317, 338. With respect to the suggestion that the
President has a plenary power to "make international agreements on any subject
whatever," they state that "[i]t is not necessary ••• to come to a conclusion on this
point. What is completely certain is that the powers of the Congress can be superaddcd
to those of the President, and that the uvo sets of powers taken together are plenary."
Id. at 246. Their comment on the argument that executive agreements conduce to the
"dangers of 'secret diplomacy' " points up their ambivalence:
These arguments appear to be rooted in a simple failure to differentiate between
the two principal classes of executive agreements: those perfected by the President
on his own responsibility, and those made in pursuance of Congressional authorization. The Constitution of the United States is, fortunately, sufficiently flexible
that it presents no necessity for choosing between the Scylla of a foreign policy
dominated by a Senatorial minority and the Charybdis of simple Presidential
agreements. It offers a third and thoroughly democratic alternative: the Congressional-Executive agreement, eliminating both the possibility of arbitrary,
injudicious or secret action and the disintegrating effects of minority obstructionism.
Id. at 552.
198. Id. at 199 (emphasis original). They also say, "Nor does the Constitution state
any limitation upon the scope of the subject matter of treaties.'' Id. at 220. But McDougal and Lans conclude that "all distinctions in the naming of these agreements'treaties,' 'executive agreements,' or 'Congressional-Executive agreements'-are merely
convenient labels .•.•" Id. at 226.
Corwin also considers that "the criteria seem lacking for a nice differentiation of
the prerogative under discussion [executive agreements] from the treaty making power,
with the result that its curtailment ••• is a problem of practical statesmanship rather
than of Constitutional Law." CoRWIN, CONTROL, supra note 28, at 120-21. Given the
express provision for Senate participation in treaty-making, any exclusion by solo
presidential agreements from such participation plainly presents a problem of "constitutional law."
199. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 639 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring). Given that "treaties" cover the field, it is unimportant that the "Constitution does not provide that the treaty-making procedure is to be the exclusive mode.''
McDougal & Lans, supra note 5, at 216. Ordinarily, express mention of one mode is
thought to exclude another, subject to rebuttal, for example, by a contrary legislative
purpose. Here the legislative intention confirms the implication of exclusivity. The
treaty power was granted to Senate and President jointly, as Hamilton explained, in
order to "afford a greater prospect of security, than the separate possession of it by
either of them." THE FEDERALIST No. 75, supra note 21, at 488. See text accompanying
notes 205-13 infra.
200. 343 U.S. 579, 639 (1952).
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by calling an agreement an executive agreement rather than a treaty,
the obligation to secure Senate approval is dissolved?"201
Fired by zeal in the midst of World War II to prevent another
holocaust by the building of a world union, and to forestall obstruction to this union by a "wilful," "undemocratic" Senate minority202
-such as blocked our adherence to the League of NationsMcDougal and Lans consigned to deepest limbo the "assumption
that the treaty-making procedure is exclusive." They stamped as
vain all "efforts to woo [the] enigmatic meaning" of the treaty
clause; the "true intention" of the Framers they considered "a
speculative domain of impenetrable obscurity." 203 However impenetrable the intention of the Framers may be in other respects, they
made clear beyond doubt that the specific objective of the treaty
clause was to preclude the President, acting alone, from entering
into international agreements. This point is so vital as to bear
detailed exposition.
Hamilton, who has been said to reflect the consensus of the
Framers,204 stated in The Federalist No. 75, that treaties are
agreements between sovereign and sovereign ... the vast importance
of the trust, and the operation of treaties as laws, plead strongly for
the participation of the whole or a portion of the legislative body in
the office of making them . . . it would be utterly unsafe and improper to entrust [the entire power of making treaties] to an elective
magistrate . . . . The history of human conduct does not warrant
that exalted opinion of human virtue which would make it wise in
a nation to commit interests of so delicate and momentous a kind, as
those which concern its intercourse with the rest of the world, to the
sole disposal of a magistrate created and circumstanced as would be
a President of the United States .... It must indeed be clear to a
demonstration that the joint possession of the power in question, by
the President and the Senate, would afford a greater prospect of security, than the separate possession of it by either of them.205
201. Kurland, supra note 145, at 626.
202. See McDougal &: Laos, supra note 5, at 187, 535, 563, 565, 567, 569, 575, 602.
203. Id. at 216-17.
204. "It cannot be reasonably doubted that Hamilton was here, as at other points,
endeavoring to reproduce the matured conclusions of the Convention itself." E. CORWIN,
THE DOC'I'RINE OF JUDICIAL REv!EW 44 (1914).
205. THE FEDERALISI' No. 75, supra note 21, at 486-87, 488. Apparently the point
loomed so large in the public mind that it had earlier been made by John Jay in
No. 64, and by Hamilton in No. 69. Jay said: "The power of making treaties is an
important one, especially as it relates to war, peace and commerce; it should not
be delegated but in such a mode, and with such precautions, as will afford the
highest security that it will be exercised by men the best qualified for the purpose,
and in the manner most conducive to the public good," i.e., as provided by the
treaty clause. Id. at 417. In No. 69, Hamilton stated: "The king of Great Britain is
the sole and absolute representative of the nation in all foreign transactions. He can
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A number of Framers spoke to the same effect in the Ratification
Conventions. James Wilson said in Pennsylvania, "[I]f the powers
of either branch are perverted, it must be with the approbation of
some one of the other branches of government. Thus checked on
each side, they can do no one act of themselves." 206 In South Carolina, C. C. Pinckney said, "Surely there is greater security in vesting
this power as the present Constitution has vested it, than in any
other body. Would the gentleman vest it in the President alone?
I£ he would, his assertion that the power we have granted was as
dangerous as the power vested by Parliament in the proclamations
of Henry VIII, might have been, perhaps, warranted • . . . [The
Senate] joined with the President ... form together a body in whom
can be best and most safely vested the diplomatic power of the
Union." 207 In North Carolina, William Davie stated that "jealousy
of executive power" would not permit a grant of treaty power to
the President alone. 208 Shortly thereafter, Roger Sherman, a delegate
to the Constitutional Convention, stated in the First Congress,
[t]he establishment of every treaty requires the voice of the Senate,
as does the appointment of every officer for conducting the business.
These two objects are expressly provided for in the Constitution, and
they lead me to believe that the two bodies ought to act jointly in
every transaction which respects the business of negotiation with
foreign powers .... There is something more required than responsibility in conducting treaties. The Constitution contemplates the
united wisdom of the President and Senate, in order to make treaties
.... The more wisdom there is employed, the greater security there
is that the public business will be well done.209

Across the vista of forty-five years, Joseph Story restated these
views.210
of his own accord make treaties of peace, commerce, alliance, and of every other
description .••• In this respect, therefore, there is no comparison between the intended
power of the President, and the actual power of the British sovereign. The one
can perform alone what the other can do only with the concurrence of a branch of
the legislature." Id. at 450-51 (emphasis added).
206. 2 J. ELLIOT, supra note 30, at 466. And he stated: "Neither the President nor
the Senate, solely, can complete a treaty; they are checks upon each other, and are
so balanced as to produce security to the people." Id. at 507.
207. 4 id. at 280-81.
208. Id. at 120.
209. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1085 (1789) (emphasis added). See also text accompanying
notes 48-63 supra.
210. 2 J. STORY, supra note 118, § 1512, at 341, 343-44:
Considering the delicacy and extent of the power, it is too much to expect that
a free people would confide to a single magistrate, however respectable, the sole
authority to act conclusively, as well as exclusively, upon the subject of treaties
...• But however proper it may be in a monarchy, there is no American statesman
but must feel that such a prerogative in an American president would be inex-
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Thus, the Founders made unmistakably plain their intention
to withhold from the President the power to enter into treaties all
by himself, because, as Francis Corbin said in Virginia, "It would
be dangerous to give this power to the President alone." 211 Hence,
they circumscribed his power over foreign intercourse by requiring
Senate participation in "every ... species of convention usual among
nations." 212 To circumvent that careful design by a mere change
of labels, by substituting the words "executive agreements" for
"treaties"-bearing in mind the absence of "significant criteria" for
distinguishing between the two--is to reduce the restrictions so
carefully fashioned by the Framers to ropes of sand.213
McDougal and Lans maintain, however, that the
Framers themselves explicitly recognized that there are international
agreements other than treaties and put this recognition into the document. In Article I, Section 10 the Constitution . . . provides that
"No state shall enter into any treaty, alliance or confederation," but
continues that "No state shall, without the consent of Congress ...
enter into any agreement or compact with another state, or with a
foreign power." Unless one takes the position that the Framers sought
to deny to the Federal Government the power to use techniques of
agreement made available to the states-an argument completely
refuted by the debates at the Convention and by contemporaneous
history-the conclusion is inescapable that the Federal Government
was intended to have the power to make "agreements" or "compacts."214

To the contrary, the fact that the Framers explicitly authorized
pedient and dangerous. It would be inconsistent with that wholesome jealousy
which all republics ought to cherish, of all depositaries of power • • ••
See also id. § 1515.
211. 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 30, at 509.
212. Letters of Camillus, in 6 A. HAMILTON, supra note 91, at 183. See text accompanying note 196 supra.
213. Compare McDougal &: Lans, supra note 5, at 199, quoted in text at note 198.
A lay view was aptly expressed in an editorial of the New York Times, April 17, 1944,
at 22, col. 1: to suggest that "treaties" be called "agreements," said the Times, "is
merely to argue that we can get around the Constitution by conspiring with each
other to call a spade by another name." See also K. COLEGROVE, THE AMERICAN SENATE
AND WORLD PEACE 31, 110 (1944); 2 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1417 (2d ed. 1945).
"The people," said 1 J. STORY, supra note 118, § 451, at 345, make and adopt constitutions, and "must be supposed to read them, with the help of common sense, and cannot
be presumed to admit in them any recondite meaning •.••" Justice Richard Yates, a
delegate to the Convention from New York, took for granted in 1788 that judges would
be bound to "give such meaning to the constitution, as comports best with the
common, and generally received acceptation of the words in which it is expressed,
regarding their ordinary and popular use •••." Quoted in E. CORWIN, CoURT OVER
CoNmnmON 235 (1938). So broad was the popular understanding of the scope of
"treaty," as evidenced by Hamilton, that it left no room for other international
agreements.
214. McDougal &: Lans, supra note 5, at 221.
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the States to enter into "agreements" but omitted to do so in the
case of the President implies a deliberate decision to withhold that
power from him.215 It is a non sequitur, moreover, to deduce from a
grant of power to a State to make "agreements" with the consent
of Congress, a presidential power to make such agreements altogether free of congressional consent; let alone that such a construction collides with the Founders' unmistakable intention to limit
presidential action in the diplomatic area by the requirement of
Senate consent. The rule of construction is to carry out, not to
defeat, that intention.216
So too, the McDougal-Lans appeal to history is misconceived.
Of course, there was general recognition of the vices of a weak,
ineffectual federal government; but to many this did not seem nearly
so perilous as a potentially tyrannical central government.217 It is
also true that a woeful deficiency under the Articles of Confederation had been State noncompliance with treaties, and the Constitution therefore made treaties enforceable against the States.218
But as Willoughby points out, "[i]n the State ratifying conventions
the fact that treaties were to be superior to State constitutions and
laws created not a little fear of possible oppression." 219 Well aware
of such sentiments, the Framers had taken pains to circumscribe the
power.220
At every turn there was jealous suspicion of a centralized government and insistence upon a grudging, carefully limited grant of
enumerated powers.221 The Framers went so far as expressly to
empower the President to ask for written opinions from executive
215. Compare T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464, 471 (1959): "Vve find it
impossible to impute to Congress an intention to give such a right to shippers under
the Motor Carrier Act when the very sections which established tbat right in Part I
[for railroads] were wholly omitted in the Motor Carrier Act," Then too, tbe State
"agreement" clause was contrived to meet a special situation. See text accompanying
notes 230-31 infra.
216. We cannot rightly prefer "a meaning which will defeat rather than effectuate
the constitutional purpose." United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 316 (1941). In
the First Congress, Elbridge Gerry stated, "Why should we construe any part of the
Constitution in such a manner as to destroy its essential principles, when a more
consonant construction can be obtained?" I .ANNAIS OF CONG. 473 (1789).
217. See BERGER, CONGRESS, supra note 32, at 8-14, 260-61.
218. Id. at 135, 234-35, 239, 307, 309, 372-73, 380, 381 n.73.
219. I W. WILLOUGHBY, THE CoNsrrrunoNAL LAw OF nm UNITED STATES 520 (2d ed.
1929).
220. See text accompanying notes 94-122 supra.
221. For example, E. Pierce, speaking generally, stated in Massachusetts, "I believe
such a superior power ought to be in Congress. But I would have it distinctly bounded,
that everyone may know the utmost limits of it ••••" 2 J. Eu.roT, supra note 30, at 77.
See also Samuel Stillman, id. at 176; text accompanying notes 116-22 supra.
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department heads; 222 but under the reasoning of McDougal and
Lans, the Framers had no qualms about entrusting to the President
"inherent" powers of unlimited scopel 223 Lee, however, assured the
Virginia Ratification Convention that "[w]hen a question arises
with respect to the legality of any power, exercised or assumed by
Congress [the question will be] ... Is it enumerated in the Constitution? ... It is otherwise arbitrary and unconstitutional."224 The
President was not held in higher esteem, witness the frequent outcries against monarchical tendencies, and the power given Congress
to impeach the President. Notwithstanding assurances such as that
of Lee,2215 the people demanded the tenth amendment to make sure
that powers not delegated to the federal government were reserved
to the States.
Another factor contributing to insistence on Senate participation
in treaty-making was noted by William Davie, who explained that
because of "the extreme jealousy of the little states" it "became
necessary to give them absolute equality [in the Senate] in making
treaties," 226 a statement confirmed by another Framer, Richard
Spaight.227 To conceive that the "little states" would then leave the
barn door wide open so that the President could singlehandedly
enter into executive agreements without their concurrence is to
upend history. McDougal and Lans explain that "[t]he need to
propitiate the small states-a rationale whose contemporary invalidity is indicated in a subsequent Section [of their article, which
dwells on the diminishing importance of States' Rights]-surely
might have been adequate reason for failure to state more explicitly
the scope of powers conferred" on the House,228 and, by parity of
reasoning, on the President. More baldly stated, this is an appeal to
repudiate the representations and compromise made to secure the
adherence of the small States to the Constitution, a sorry basis for
the authors' high-minded plea for a more "democratic" process. In
seeking the meaning of constitutional language, it is the understanding of the Framers that is all important. As Justice Iredell,
who had fought valiantly but vainly for ratification in North
Carolina, said, "We are too apt, in estimating a law passed at a
222. U.S. CoNsr. art. II, § 2, cl. I.
223. The point was made by Justice Jackson in Youngstown Sheet &: Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 640-41 (1952) (concurring opinion).
224. 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 30, at 186.
225. BERGER, CONGRESS, supra note 32, at 13-14, 124-35.
226. 4 J. ELLIOT, supra note 30, at 120. See McDougal&: I.ans, supra note 5, at 538.
227. 4 J. ELLIOT, supra note 30, at 27.
228. McDougal &: Lans, supra note 5, at 236.
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remote period, to combine, in our consideration, all the subsequent
events which have had an influence upon it, instead of confining
ourselves (which we ought to do) to the existing circumstances at
the time of its passing." 229
Before leaving the State "compact" clause, a word as to the
distinction there drawn between a "treaty, alliance or confederation"
and an "agreement or compact." How does this square with the
comprehensive scope given to the treaty clause by Hamilton? "Agreements" and "compacts" between some States, regulating boundaries,
rights of fishery, and the like-of which the Framers were doubtless
aware-had been entered into prior to adoption of the Constitution. 280 It is reasonable to infer that the "compact" clause provided
for such arrangements, drawing a distinction between them and
the more political "treaty, alliance or confederation," which were
forbidden absolutely. Given the broad understanding of federal
treaties recorded by Hamilton, there is no place in the treaty clause
for the more restricted reading of "treaty" as it is used in the
"compact" clause, where a distinction was made to meet a special
situation. It is familiar learning that the same words may have
different meanings in the different contexts of the.same statute when
they are directed to different purposes.281 In any event, the decisive
factor is not the content of "agreement" so much as the fact that
the sole use of that word in the Constitution was conditioned on
consent by Congress. It cannot be divorced from such consent in
order to liberate the President from the consent of the Senate that
the treaty clause requires.
It remains to consider a remarkable assertion by McDougal and
Lans: where executive "agreements are predicated upon the President's independent constitutional powers, such as in the field of
foreign relations, under the separation of powers doctrine, Congressional action might not affect . . . the domestic effect of the agreement ... .'' 282 They are aware that "a treaty may be terminated ...
by a Congressional act ..." ;288 but
229. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 267 (1796).
230. Weinfield, What Did the Framers of the Federal Constitution Mean by "Agreements or Compacts?", 3 U. Cm. L. R.Ev. 453, 464 (1936). Writing in 1803, Judge St.
George Tucker cited the Virginia-Maryland "compact" of 1785 for the regulation of
navigation on boundary waters and the like, as an example of the "agreements or
compacts" contemplated by the compact clause. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, app.,
at 309 (Tucker ed. 1803).
231. Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433-34 (1932).
232. McDougal & Lans, supra note 5, at 338.
233. Id. at 334.
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if the subject of the [executive] agreement is a matter within the

President's special constitutional competence-related, for example,
to the recognition of a foreign government or to an exercise of his
authority as Commander-in-Chief . . . the separation of powers
doctrine might . . . permit the President to disregard the statute
as an unconstitutional invasion of his own power.234
Thus an executive agreement, nowhere mentioned in the Constitution, is exalted above a treaty for which explicit provision is made-a
treaty may be repealed by Congress, not so an executive agreement!
The Commander-in-Chief power is ill-suited to support such a
claim. Hamilton explained that this authority "would amount to
nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first General and admiral ..."; 235 and Corwin properly understood this to mean that the President "will have
no powers that any high military or naval commander ... might not
have," 236 an unlikely source of power to enter into untouchable
international agreements. Then, too, virtually every State Constitution had made the Governor "Commander in Chief," who was
to act under the laws of the State, which is to say, subject to legislative governance.237 Reiterated emphasis in the several Ratifying
Conventions that the President's major function was to execute
the laws,238 reinforced by the Article II, section 3 provision that
"he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed," reflects
the same concern and repels any inference that the Commander-inChief clause conferred power which soars above the "law-making"
powers of Congress. Similarly, the President's power of "recognition"
derives from his power to "receive" ambassadors, which Hamilton
was constrained to explain "is more a matter of dignity than of
234. Id. at 317.
235. THE FEDERALIST No. 69, supra note 21, at 448.
236. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, supra note 6, at 276. For extended discussion, see
Berger, War-Making, supra note 17, at 37-38. Compare the Supreme Court statement
in Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424, 435 (1902) that the "commander-in-chief" would

require statutory authorization for the return under treaty of Russian deserters. See text
accompanying note 243 infra.
237. Article VII of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 provides that the
Governor shall be "commander-in-chief," and that his powers shall "be exercised agreeably to ••• the laws of the land and not otherwise." I B. PooRE, supra note 96, at
965-66. For Delaware, Article 9, id. at 275; for Georgia, Article 33, id. at 381; for
New Hampshire (identical with Massachusetts), 2 id. at 1288.
Hamilton stated in THE FEDERALIST No. 69, supra note 21, at 449: "The constitutions
of several of the States expressly declare their governors to be commanders-in-chief
••• and it may well be a question, whether those of New Hampshire and Massachusetts,
in particular, do not, in this instance, confer larger powers upon their respective
governors, than could be claimed by a President of the United States."
238. See text accompanying notes 97-109 supra.
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authority" and "will be without consequence in the administration
of the government ... ." 289 On such flimsy foundations McDougal and
Lans would erect an "independent" presidential power to enter into
executive agreements, which are beyond "invasion" by Congress.
The crowning incongruity is their appeal to the separation of
powers to protect such solo agreements from congressional invasion.
What magic in the dubious, inexplicit presidential solo power calls
forth a protection denied to the express provision for Senate participation in the all-inclusive treaty-making power? Why does respect
for express constitutional provisions exhibit "mechanical, filiopietistic" slavery to words240 whereas invocation of implicit doctrines such as the separation of powers is free of that taint? To my
mind, McDougal and Lans apply a double standard of constitutional
interpretation, turning on whose ox is gored.
B. Supreme Court Decisions

Constitutional "law" seldom exhibits such frail underpinning as
was mustered by McDougal and Lans for judicial recognition of solo
presidential executive agreements. Consider their reliance on Tucker
v. Alexandroff,241 in which "the Supreme Court intimated by way
of dictum that the President was empowered to make agreements
permitting passage of foreign troops through the United States and
could thereby divest all American officials of jurisdiction over such a
military force." 242 The issue presented was whether a member of the
Russian navy, who had deserted while awaiting the launching of a
Russian war ship in Philadelphia, came within a Russian treaty
calling for return of deserters from Russian ships. In passing, the
Court remarked:
While no act of Congress authorizes the executive department to
permit the introduction of foreign troops, the power to give such
permission without legislative assent was probably assumed to exist
from the authority of the President as commander-in-chief.... It may
be doubted, however, whether such power could be extended to
the apprehension of deserters in the absence of positive legislation to
that effect.243

As Corwin said, the question of the validity of "this species of agreement" was "touched upon in rather equivocal terms." 244 If this be
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

See text accompanying note 21 supra.
See text accompanying note 271 infra.
183 U.S. 424 (1902).
McDougal &: Lans, supra note 5, at 310.
183 U.S. at 435,
CORWIN, CONTROL, supra note 28, at 118.
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judicial recognition of executive agreements, the Court's emphasis
that return of deserters required legislative assent confines it to the
narrowest compass.
Next, McDougal and Lans state:
The general powers of the President to make executive agreements
seem to have been first touched by the Supreme Court in 1933,
in Monaco v. Mississippi wherein Chief Justice Hughes stated: "The
National Government, by virtue of its control of our foreign relations is entitled to employ the resources of diplomatic negotiations
and to effect such an international settlement as may be found appropriate, through treaty, agreement of arbitration, or otherwise."245

The question in Monaco was whether a state could be sued by a
foreign state without her consent; whether the President could make
an executive agreement by himself was not in issue. Hughes' reference to the power of the "National Government" to act does not
necessarily imply that the President is authorized to act without the
consent of the Senate. A redistribution of constitutional powers
should not rest on strained inferences.246
McDougal and Lans next summon the Curtiss-Wright case.247
That case, it will be recalled, was later dismissed by Justice Jackson
because it "involved, not the question of the President's power to act
without congressional authority, but the question of his right to act
in accord with an act of Congress." 248 Justice Sutherland's dictum
regarding the President's "inherent" powers is without historical
foundation; and his reliance on Marshall for the statement that
"participation in the exercise of the power [over external affairs] is
significantly limited"249 all but perverts Marshall's "sole organ"
remark. 250 Subsequent reliance on Sutherland's dicta underscores
the wisdom of Marshall's dismissal of his own dicta in Marbury v.
lvfadison251 when they were pressed upon him in a subsequent case.252
245. McDougal & Lans, supra note 5, at 310, quoting 292 U.S. 313, 331 (1934)
(emphasis by McDougal & Lans).
246. As the Supreme Court stated in Brady v. Roosevelt S.S. Co., 317 U.S. 575,
580-81 (1943), "[S)uch a basic change in one of the fundamentals of the law of agency
should hardly be left to conjecture."
247. McDougal & Lans, supra note 5, at 255-56, 310.
248. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-36 & n.2 (1952)
(concurring opinion). Curtiss-Wright merely held that the congressional delegation to
the President was constitutional. 299 U.S. at 327-28.
249. 299 U.S. at 319. For refutation of Sutherland's "inherent" power dictum, see
text accompanying notes 94-122, 143-87 supra.
250. See text accompanying notes 78-85 supra.
251. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
252. It is a maxim, not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every
opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions
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"The dicta of the Monaco and Curtiss-Wright cases," McDougal
and Lans tell us, "were the capstones of the decisions in the Belmont
and Pink cases, dealing with the validity and interpretation of an
assignment of Russian-mvned assets in the United States, which was
one of several executive agreements negotiated when the United
States recognized the Soviet government in 1933."253 In the Belmont
case,254 Justice Sutherland once more delivered himself of sweeping
dicta:
[I]n respect of what was done here, the Executive had authority to
speak as the sole organ of that [national] government. The assignment and the agreements in connection therewith did not, as in the
case of treaties, as that term is used in the treaty making clause of
the Constitution ... require the advice and consent of the Senate.255
No account was taken by Sutherland of the history which demonstrates the intention of the Founders to withhold from the
President the right to enter into international agreements without
Senate consent. Instead, he reasoned from B. Altman & Co. v. United
States256 that an international compact may be distinguished from a
treaty. There a reciprocal agreement had been made with France under authority of the Tariff Act; and the sole question presented to the
Court was whether Congress, by permitting a direct appeal to the
Supreme Court with respect to treaties, intended to encompass such
a compact. In answering this question, the Court stated, "True,
that under the Constitution . . . the treaty-making power is vested
in the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,"
but it concluded that the reciprocal agreement "was a compact
are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to
control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is presented for
decision. The reason of this maxim is obvious. The question actually before the
court is investigated with care, and considered in its full extent. Other principles
which may serve to illustrate it, are considered in their relation to the case
decided, but their possible bearing on all other cases is seldom completely investi•
gated.
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399-400 (1821).
253. McDougal &: I.ans, supra note 5, at 311.
254. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
255. 301 U.S. at 330. Sutherland disposed of the issues in lordly fashion: that the
agreements "were within the competence of the President may not be doubted." Earlier
he had stated that "international agreements which arc not treaties in the full
constitutional sense, are perhaps confined to such as affect administrative matters, as
distinguished from policies, and those which are of only individual concern, or of
limited scope and duration, as distinguished from those of general consequence and
permanent character." G. SUTHERLAND, supra note 22, at 121.
Borchard stated that about 5 million dollars were accepted in return for the
sacrifice of 300 million dollars in American claims arising out of confiscations in
Russia. Borchard, supra note 189, at 647.
256. 224 U.S. 583 (1912).
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authorized by the Congress . .. and such a compact is a treaty" for
the purposes of the appeals statute.257 In thus treating the authorized
compact as a treaty for the purposes of a special appeals statute, the
Court did not purport to sanction executive agreements not authorized by Congress, a jump unhesitatingly made by Justice Sutherland. Justice Stone, in an opinion joined by Justices Brandeis and
Cardozo, concurred with a key reservation:
We may, for present purposes, assume that the United States, by
treaty ... could alter the policy which a State might otherwise adopt.
It is unnecessary to consider whether the present agreement between
the two governments can rightly be given the same effect as a treaty
within this rule, for neither the allegations ... nor the diplomatic
exchanges, suggest that the United States has either recognized or
declared that any state policy is to be overridden.258
And so we arrive at United States v. Pink,259 in which the issue
reserved by Justice Stone was presented, and where Justice Douglas,
citing Belmont and Curtiss-Wright, stated that the
Litvinov Assignment was an international compact which did not
require the participation of the Senate. . . . Power to remove such
obstacles to full recognition as settlement of claims of our nationals
... certainly is a modest implied power of the President who is the
"sole organ of the federal government in the field of international
relations."260
The Pink case had no occasion to rule that a presidential agreement
could be made against the wishes of Congress; and in fact Justice
Douglas said that the executive policy had been "tacitly" recognized
by congressional appointment of commissioners to determine American claims against the Soviet fund. 261 The dissent of Chief Justice
Stone, in which Justice Roberts joined, is incontrovertible: "[W]e
are referred to no authority which would sustain such an exercise
of power as is said to have been exerted here by mere assignment
unratified by the Senate." 262
257. 224 U.S. at 600, 601 (emphasis added).
258. 301 U.S. at 336 (emphasis added).
259. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
260. 315 U.S. at 229. The Government had argued that "[t]he authority of the
President to enter into executive agreements with foreign nations without the consent
of the Senate is established," citing Monaco and Curtiss-Wright, 315 U.S. at 208 (emphasis added). Thus are dicta blown up into "established" law.
261. 315 U.S. at 227-28.
262. 315 U.S. at 249. McDougal &: Lans, supra note 5, at 310, also rely on Watts
v. United States, I Wash. Terr. 288, 294 (1870), for the proposition that "an executive
agreement between Great Britain and the United States ••. with regard to jurisdiction
over San Juan Island, was deemed to modify the Organic Law of the territory, as
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We need only recall Davie's references to the prevalent distrust
of executive power,263 to the jealous insistence by the small States
on participation in treaty-making on an equal basis in the Senate,26 ~
to the fears that surfaced in the Ratification Conventions-despite
Senate participation-that the power to override state laws might
lead to oppression,265 in order to conclude that without Senate participation the treaty power would have found no acceptance. To
allow an executive agreement to override state law or policy on the
ground that it represents "a modest implied power" is to ignore the
Founders' plain intention to withhold that power from the President.
This is confirmed by Article VI, which makes only "Laws" and
"Treaties" the "supreme law of the land," binding upon the states.266
It would require a constitutional amendment, for which the Pink
case is an inadequate substitute, to make an "executive agreement,"
concluded by the President alone, equally binding.
At best, the not so "modest implied power" of the President to
enter into such agreements with the tacit consent of Congress
amounts to no more than a concurrent power that Congress can
curtail by statute, as Justice Jackson reminded us in the Steel Seizure
case.267 Were the issue presented anew by a congressional challenge
to presidential entry into executive agreements without its consent,
the cases would be far from conclusive.
Ill.

ADAPTATION BY USAGE

There is no dispute about the intention of the Founders to make
the Senate an equal partner in the conduct of foreign affairs. Nor
is this a case in which "plain meaning is an illusory goal," 268 or in
which an ambiguous grant to the President may be clarified by
resort to his long-continued "practice." Were the textual requirement of Senate "advice and consent" in the making of treaties
enacted by Congress." Whether one can distill such a "holding" from the three separate
opinions in the case is at least debatable; and one may question whether the Supreme
Court would allow a presidential agreement to override an Act of Congress. See text
accompanying note 267 infra.
263. See text accompanying note Ill supra.
264. See text accompanying note 226 supra.
265. See text accompanying note 219 supra.
266. For discussion of the "binding" phrase, see BERGER, CONGRESS, supra note 32, at
233-34.
267. Youngstown Sheet &: Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637-39 (1952). Given
concurrent powers, Chief Justice Marshall held in an early war-power case, a congressional statute must prevail. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177-78
(1804).
268. Reveley, supra note 4, at 1251.

November 1972]

Monopoly of Foreign Relations

49

equivocal, its meaning was made clear beyond peradventure by the
explanations of the Framers and Ratifiers.269 We begin, therefore,
with an unambiguous constitutional requirement that treatiesmeaning all international agreements, and all that goes into their
making-are to be the joint function of President and Senate.
"Adaptation by usage" is a label designed to render palatable
the disagreeable claim that the President may by his own practices
revise the Constitution, that he may disrupt the constitutional distribution of powers, considered inviolable under the separation of
powers.27° For McDougal and Lans, one who opposes this claim is
enslaved by "the words of the Constitution as timeless absolutes," a
prey "to mechanical, filio-pietistic theory": 271 "Whether these powers
are based on an interpretation of the language of the Constitution
or on usage is, strictly, a matter of concern only for rhetoricians ...." 272 Impatiently brushing aside "the absolute artifacts of
verbal archeology," "the idiosyncratic purposes of the Framers,"
they maintain that "continuance of [a] practice by successive administrations throughout our history makes its contemporary constitutionality unquestionable." 278 In blunter terms, usurpation of
269. Influential apologists for expanded presidential powers are agreed in this. See
text accompanying note 29 supra.
270. In rejecting the demand of the House for documents respecting the Jay Treaty,
President Washington said, "It is essential to the due administration of the Government, that the boundaries fixed by the Constitution between the different departments
should be preserved." 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 761-62 (1796). The executive branch dings
to the separation of powers when it claims a right to withhold information from Congress under the doctrine of "executive privilege." See testimony of Secretary of State
William P. Rogers and Assistant Attorney General William H. Rehnquist in July 1971.
Hearings, supra note 13, at 473, 430. Compare Justice Douglas in Youngstown, 343 U.S.
at 632 (concurring opinion): "If we sanctioned the present exercise of power by the
President, we would be expanding Article II of the Constitution and rewriting it to
suit the political conveniences of the present emergency." See also :Berger, War-Making,
supra note 17, at 68-69 n.256.
What the separation of powers meant to the Founders was spelled out in the
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, drafted by John Adams. Article XXX provides:
"In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall never
exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them; the executive shall never
exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them; • • • to the end it
may be a government of laws, not of men." 1 :B. POORE, supra note 96, at 960. See also
the New Hampshire Constitution of 1784, pt. I, art. 37, 2 id. at 1283, and the Georgia
Constitution of 1777, art. I, l id. at 378.
Charles Pinckney submitted to the Convention that the President "cannot be
cloathed with those executive authorities the Chief Magistrate of a Government often
possesses; because they are vested in the Legislature, and cannot be used or delegated
by them in any, but the specified mode." 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 30, at lll.
271. McDougal &: Lans, supra note 5, at 212.
272. Id. at 239 n.104 (emphasis original).
273. Id. at 291. Compare their comment, "The phrase 'treaty of peace,' when bereft
of the reification which makes it some mysterious, special kind of an agreement,"
is included in the scope of presidential executive agreements, id. at 286, with events
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power, if repeated often enough, accomplishes an amendment of the
Constitution and a transfer of power.274
Although this view has commended itself to the academicians, it
has not won the assent of the Supreme Court. In Powell v.
McCormack, 215 the House of Representatives argued that the exclusion of Adam Clayton Powell on grounds not enumerated in
the Constitution was supported by earlier, similar House exclusions;
but the Court declared: "That an unconstitutional action has been
taken before surely does not render that same action any less unconstitutional at a later date." 276 From George Washington on,277
"usurpation" of power has not been a mere pejorative expletive but
in the Convention. Madison moved to "except treaties of peace" from the two-thirds
concurrence provision. Gerry objected that treaties of peace were of especial importance;
and Hugh Williamson stated, "Treaties of peace should be guarded at least by requiring the same concurrence as in other Treaties." 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 30, at 540-41.
The exception was rejected. For the Framers a treaty of peace was unmistakably
a "special kind of agreement," for reasons which were not at all "mysterious."
274. A "practice so deeply embedded in our governmental structure should be
treated as decisive of the constitutional issue." Monaghan, supra note 4, at 31. "[H)istory
has legitimated the practice of presidential war-making." Id. at 29. For similar views,
see Ratner, The Coordinated Warmaking Power-Legislative, Executive and Judicial
Roles, 44 S. CAL. L. R.Ev. 461, 467 (1971). Cf. Reveley, supra note 4, at 1250-57.
"If acts forbidden by a reasonable reading of the rules continue to be performed it
is highly unrealistic to regard the rules as complete statements of the law. To constitute 'the law' the course of conduct dictated by the rules must be the one followed
in actual practice." Reveley, supra, at 1253, citing McDougal, Jurisprudence for a Free
Society, 1 GA. L. R.Ev. 1, 4 (1966). We cannot march "in the lock-step of the Framers'
intent, •.• upon occasion even the clear intent of the Drafters must be abandoned
without the process of formal amendment, if the Constitution is to minister successfully to needs created by changing times." Reveley, supra, at 1253. What are the
"needs" for presidential war-making, or for presidential monopoly of foreign relations?
Compare note 192 supra.
In justice to Reveley, he equally condemns the automatic assumption that practice
makes constitutional, supra, at 1253, and proffers a compromise, which all too shortly
put is: "In determining the meaning of any constitutional provision, the ultimate
criterion must be the long-term best interests of the country." Reveley, supra, at 1251,
1253-56. Who is to determine that issue? If that decision is for the President, analysis
is little advanced. Under the Constitution, the decision maker must be the people, by
means of an amendment.
John Quincy Adams arraigned President Tyler in 1842 for "gross abuse of constitutional power, and bold assumption of power never vested in him by law." Quoted
in Warren, Presidential Declaration• of Independence, 10 B.U. L. R.Ev. 1, 13 (1930).
275. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
276. 395 U.S. at 546. In Youngstown Sheet &: Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 549, 588
(1952), the Court stated: "It is said that other Presidents without congressional
authority have taken possession of private business enterprises in order to settle labor
disputes. But even if this be true, Congress has not thereby lost its exclusive consti•
tutional authority to make laws necessary and proper to carry out the powers" vested
in the Government.
277. See text accompanying note 292 infra.
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expressive rather of an abiding fear fed by the deepest wells of our
constitutional history.21s
It is therefore McDougal and Lans, I suggest, who were wordintoxicated. For the issue is not one of words but of power. Whence
does the President derive authority to transfer to himself exclusively
the power conferred by the Constitution on President and Senate
jointly? To this McDougal and Lans replied,
[i]t is utterly fantastic to suppose that a document framed 150 years
ago "to start a government experiment for an agricultural, sectional,
seaboard folk of some three millions" could be interpreted today
... in terms of the "true meaning" of its original Framers for the
purpose of controlling the "government of a nation, a hundred and
thirty millions strong, whose population and advanced industrial
civilization have spread across a continent." Each generation of citizens must in a very real sense interpret the words of the Framers to
create its own constitution.279

From which "generation of citizens" did the President derive a
mandate to revise the Constitution under the guise of "interpretation"?
It is not as if the Framers did not foresee that the fledgling, seacoast nation would cover the continent and from time to time need
to change the Constitution. For in Article V they provided a process
of amendment, not, to be sure, made too easy; 280 but this was for
protection of minorities against roughshod majorities. Because, in
the words of McDougal and Lans, "the process of amendment is
politically difficult, other modes of change have emerged." 281 Truly
278. For citations, see BERGER, CONGRESS, supra note 32, at 12-14, 24, 126-27, 131-33,
136-40.
279. McDougal &: Lans, supra note 5, at 214-15, quoting from Llewellyn, The
Constitution as an Institution, 34 CoLUM. L. REv. I, 3 (1934). Ratner, supra note 274, at
467, tells us that "constitutional policy for ensuing epochs is not congealed in the
mold of 1787 referants."
280. The Founders fully understood the difficulties of amendment. Thus Patrick
Henry argued in the Virginia Convention, "four of the smallest states, that do not
collectively contain one tenth part of the population ••• may obstruct the most salutary
and necessary amendments." 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 30, at 49. But the prevailing view
was expressed in the North Carolina Convention by James Iredell: The Constitution
"can be altered with as much regularity, and as little confusion, as any Act of Assembly; not, indeed, quite so easily, which would be extremely impolitic ••• so that
alterations can without difficulty be made agreeable to the general sense of the people."
4 id. at 177. In Massachusetts, Charles Jarvis said, "[W]e shall have in this article an
adequate provision for all the purposes of political reformation." 2 Id. at 116.
281. McDougal &: Lans, supra note 5, at 293. The young Woodrow Wilson, in
CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 242 (1885), likewise stated that "[t]he legal processes of
constitutional change are so slow and cumbersome that we have been constrained to
adopt a serviceable framework of fictions which enables us easily to preserve the forms
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a marvelous non sequitur: because the amending process is cumbersome-and designedly so-the servants of the people may informally
amend the Constitution without consulting them! 282
"The people," said James Iredell, "have chosen to be governed
under such and such principles. They have not chosen to be governed or promised to submit upon any other . . . .''283 Conscious
that a mandate for change must proceed from the people, McDougal
and Lans argue that
[t]he crucial constitutional fact is that the people (Presidents, Supreme Court Justices, Senators, Congressmen and electorate) who
have lived under the document for 150 years have interpreted it ...
[to] authorize the making of international agreements other than
treaties on most of the important problems of peace and war.284

Now the inescapable fact is that such issues have never really been
explained to the people; 285 much less has the judgment of the elecwithout laboriously obeying the spirit of the Constitution • • . ."I Because of the
"difficulty of its formal amendment process, alteration by usage has proved to be the
principal means of modifying our fundamental law." Reveley, supra note 4, at 1252.
Amendment is difficult: ergo, the President writes himself a blank check to act outside
constitutional bounds.
282. In the First Congress, Elbridge Gerry, one of the Framers, stated, "If it is
an omitted case, an attempt in the legislature to supply the defect, will in fact be an
attempt to amend the Constitution. But this can only be done in the way pointed
out by the fifth article of that instrument, and an attempt to amend it any other way
may be a high crime or misdemeanor ••.." The people, he added, have "directed a
particular mode of making amendments, which we are not at liberty to depart from.
. • • Such a power would render the most important clause in the Constitution
nugatory." 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 503 (1789). The Doyen of American legal historians,
Willard Hurst, remarked in our time that the informal amendment approach "is a
way of practically reading Article V out of the Federal Constitution •••. [The Framers]
provided a defined, regular procedure for changing or adapting it." Discussion in E.
CAHN, SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 74 (1954). "The framers of the Constitution
might have adopted a different method • • • • It is not the function of courts or
legislative bodies, national or state, to alter the method which the Constitution has
fixed." Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 227 (1920).
283. 2 G. McREE, LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES !REDELL 146 (1857). See also
BERGER, CONGRESS, supra note 32, at 13-14.
284. McDougal & Lans, supra note 5, at 216 (emphasis added). They also state that
"[i]n preferring to alter the Constitution by informal adaptation, the American people
have also been motivated by a wise realization of the inevitable transiency of political
arrangements." Id. at 294 (emphasis added).
285. Compare Professor Felix Frankfurter's advice to President Franklin D. Roosevelt
in 1937: "[T]he Supreme Court for about a quarter of a century has distorted the power
of judicial review into a revision of legislative policy, thereby usurping powers belonging to the Congress ..•." And "[p]eople have been taught to believe that when the
Supreme Court speaks it is not they who speak but the Constitution, whereas, of course,
in so many vital cases, it is they who speak and not the Constitution. And I verily
believe that that is what the country needs most to understand." RoosEVELT AND FRANK•
FURTER: THEIR CORRESPONDENCE, 1928-1945, at 384, 383 (M. Freedman ed. 1967) (emphasis original).
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torate ever been solicited. Would "the people," for example, have
approved the Supreme Court's freshly minted "interpretation" of
"due process" in the 1880's-whereby it repeatedly overturned
amelioratory socio-economic legislation-had they been told that up
to that time "due process" connoted "procedural" due process only,
which did not vitiate such legislation, and that the shift to a
"substantive" content was a purely judicial construct without
foundation in constitutional history? 286 Would "the people" approve
the presidential revision whereunder the President claims power,
acting alone, to commit us to a Vietnam War, if they were told that
the bloodletting is justified, not by the constitutional text nor by the
intention of the Framers (which runs clearly to the contrary), but by
a boot-strap theory of power built upon successive usurpations?287
Reveley, who is sympathetic to amendment by "usage," sapiently
observes that the "general public takes a relatively black letter view
of the Constitution," and that the "subtleties" of amendment "by
usage ... would probably be lost on the general public." 288 It is
therefore idle to impute informal ratification of the presidential
power take-over to "the people." "The people" have been told that
the President has exercised power conferred upon him by the Constitution, by which, in their benighted way, they understand textual
warrant, not a long-continued violation of the Constitution.
Alexander Hamilton, the daring pioneer advocate of expanded
presidential powers, stated with respect to the express treaty powers
(as distinguished from a power merely rested on "usage") that
a delegated authority [e.g., the President] cannot alter the constituting act, unless so expressly authorized by the constituting power.
286. Charles P. Curtis, an ardent advocate of "adaptation" of the Constitution,
states that when the Framers put "due process of law ••• into the Fifth Amendment,
its meaning was as fixed and definite as the common law could make a phrase. It had
been chiseled into the law so incisively that any lawyer and a few others, could read
it and understand it. It meant a procedural process, which could be easily ascertained
from almost any law book. We turned the legal phrase into common speech and
raised its meaning into the similitude of justice itself." Curtis, Review and Majority
Rule, in E. CAHN, supra note 282, at 170, 177. McCloskey refers to "the years after
1877 when the slow accumulation of precedent was transmuting the due process clause
and the commerce clause into the legal embodiment of a laissez-faire philosophy."
R. MCCLOSKEY, THE MODERN SUPREME COURT 206 (1972). See also Hamilton, The Path of
Due Process of Law, in THE CONSTITUTION RECONSIDERED 167 (C. Read ed. 1938).
287. Seeking to strike a compromise between "strict construction" and free "adaptation," Reveley, supra note 4, at 1293, states that "uuless there is pressing need for its
amendment, popular understanding of the rule of law dictates adherence to provisions
whose language and initial intent seems clear. The power vested in Congress to declare
war is a primal instance of such a provision."
288. Reveley, supra note 4, at 1293, 1255 n.31.
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An agent cannot new model his own commission. A treaty, for example, cannot trans/er the legislative power to the executive department.289

Now Hamilton's followers would claim that the President can by
virtue of his own "usage" "new model his own commission" and
"transfer the legislative power to the executive."
To a believer in constitutional government, in the separation
of powers as a safeguard against dictatorship,290 there is no room for
a take-over by the President of powers that were denied to him, and,
as our times demonstrate, denied with good reason. "Ours is a
government of divided authority," declared Justice Black in 1957,
"on the assumption that in division there is not only strength but
freedom from tyranny." 291 If present exigencies demand a redistribution of powers in which Congress was originally fully to sharea presidential power by his conduct of foreign affairs to propel the
nation into war without consulting Congress-that decision ought
candidly to be submitted to the people in the form of a proposed
amendment, not masked by euphemisms. For me, the polestar
remains the advice given to the nation by George Washington:
The necessity of reciprocal checks in the exercise of political power;
by dividing and distributing it into different depositories, and constituting each the guardian of the Public Weal against invasions by the
others has been evinced.... To preserve them must be as necessary
as to institute them. If in the opinion of the People, the distribution
or modification of the Constitutional powers be in any particular
wrong, let it be corrected by an amendment in the way which the
Constitution designates. But let there be no change by usurpation;
for though this, in one instance, may be the instrument of good, it is
the customary weapon by which free governments are destroyed. The
precedent must always greatly overbalance in permanent evil any
partial or transient benefit which the use can at any time yield.292
289. Letters of Camillus, 6 A. HAMILTON, supra note 91, at 166 (emphasis added).
290. See note 270 supra.
291. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 40 (1957).
292. 35 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 228-29
Fitzpatrick ed. 1940).
The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, art. XVIII, states that the people "have a
right to require of their lawgivers and magistrates an exact and constant observance"
of the "fundamental principles of the constitution" which are "absolutely necessary to
preserve the advantages of liberty and to maintain a free government." 1 B. PooRE,
supra note 96, at 959.
How does Washington's advice square with the statement that the Constitution is
"being ceaselessly adapted, as its Framers intended, to the problems of 'ages to come'"?
McDougal &: Lans, supra note 5, at 294 (emphasis added). Marshall expressly disclaimed that his "ages to come" dictum was meant to condone any enlargement of
powers. See Berger, War-Making, supra note 17, at 50-52.

a.
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CONCLUSION

It cannot seriously be maintained that either solo presidential
executive agreements or a presidential monopoly of foreign relations
in particular negotiations, find warrant in the constitutional text.
Instead, the unmistakable intention of the Founders was to constitute the Senate an equal partner in this domain for the greater
security of the nation. The argument for monopoly is rested on longcontinued practice-"adaptation by usage"-which in less polite
terms means that the executive may "new model his own commission." That way, sober scholars have concluded, lies the road to
dictatorship. 293
Already solo presidential operations have plunged the nation
into calamitous and divisive adventures. In that light, to move from
constitutional to practical considerations, such deficiencies as Senate
participation may exhibit294 are greatly overshadowed by the perils
of presidential monopoly. A presidential reallocation of constitutional powers, to paraphrase Washington, is a cure worse than the
disease. Whatever the force of the practical arguments, assumptions
of practical convenience are hardly a basis for setting aside express
constitutional provisions.
Arguments of practical convenience and wisdom, moreover, run
at least as strongly against as for "monopoly" claims. Behind presidential claims to sole control lies the complacent assumption that
the President and his advisers have a monopoly on wisdom. 295 One
need not subscribe to all the harsh criticism of presidential policy
in Vietnam to entertain large doubts as to its wisdom. Recently, the
President's neglect to advise Japan of his forthcoming visit to China,
his heavy-handed treatment of Japanese economic relations with
the United States have, in the opinion of former Under Secretary
of State George Ball, needlessly alienated the Japanese and danger293. R. DAHL, supra note 6, at 116, 264; Kurland, supra note 145, at 625, 628.
294. For suggested internal reforms of Congress, see R. DAHL, supra note 6, at
140-68.
295. For citations, see Berger, War-Making, supra note 17, at 84.
At the time of the Roosevelt-Churchill Atlantic Conference, "President and State
Department believed they had information, experience, and a grasp of issues involved
that Congress and electorate lacked. Responsibility to Congress, they evidently believed, would have led to suicidal policies. They therefore chose to avoid Congressional control over certain aspects of foreign policy." R. DAHL, supra note 6, at 180.
Dahl concludes that if Roosevelt's appraisal was correct, "this is the severest condemnation possible of the arrangement for information and intelligence [i.e., presidential
withholding on the theory of executive privilege] by which Congress as contrasted with
the President possessed such a terrifying incapacity for rationality and understanding
of international events in a moment of great national crisis." Id.
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ously strained if not irretrievably injured a valuable alliance.296
Presidents, too, can be lacking in wisdom.
It is a mistake to exalt presidential over senatorial expertise in
the conduct of foreign affairs. Granted that the State Department
may develop a corps of experts, "the more closely debate moves
towards broad and basic policy," Robert Dahl notes, "the more
competent is the legislative decision likely to be, and correspondingly less competent is the expert."297 Nor is the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee to be underrated in terms of expertise. Over
the years, the Committee has had within its ranks "an imposing
array of great names" ;298 today the Chairman, Senator J. William
Fulbright, measures up to any member of the State Department in
sheer intellectual power and experience.299 A sampling of the 19281949 period disclosed that a foreign policy proposal was likely to be
examined by men "who ha[d] been serving on the Foreign Relations
Committee for almost seven and a half years on the average-a
rather substantial apprenticeship." 30° Contrast this with appointments as Secretary of State of men like William Rogers, who had
virtually no experience in foreign affairs. 301 Consultation with the
296. Ball, We Are Playing a Dangerous Game with Japan, N.Y. Times, June 25,
1972, § 6 (Magazine), at 10. Moreover, there is "no guarantee that all the rationality
of the executive-administrative will be used for any other purpose than fulfilling in
foreigu policy the private preferences of the President or members of the State Department." R. DAHL, supra note 6, at 181. For example, "the most remarkable feature of
[Lord] Halifax's unwavering support for the appeasement of Nazi Germany was his
utter incomprehension of the widespread and growing revulsion for this policy."
P. R.IcHARDs, supra note 7, at 73.
297. R. DAHL, supra note 6, at 244.
298. Id. at 146. Among others were Andrew Jackson, Henry Clay, Daniel Webster,
Stephen A. Douglas, William H. Seward, Charles Sumner, Elihu Root, Henry Cabot
Lodge.
299. As a freshman member of the House, Fulbright introduced a resolution in
1943 respecting post-war participation in an organization for preservation of peace, to
avoid a repetition of the Versailles Treaty rejection. J. ROBINSON, CoNGRESS A.ND FOR·
EIGN POLICY MAKING: A STUDY IN LEGISLATIVE INFLUENCE A.ND lNITIA.TlVE 33-34 (1962).
Robinson, at 211, states: "Fulbright's reputation in and out of the Senate is that of a
thoughtful, learned man, perhaps one of the most intellectual Senators in the whole
history of the institution. He has been identified with many 'right' and far-sighted
positions since he was elected to the Senate in 1944." Former Ambassador John
Kenneth Galbraith stated, "Over the last half-decade Fulbright, Morse, Gruening,
Kennedy, Cooper, Church, Hatfield and McGovern have surely been more sensible
than the senior officials of the Department of State. On the average I think we are
safer if we keep foreign policy under the influence of men who must be re-elected."
Galbraith, Book Review, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1972, § 7, at 1, 12.
300. R. DAHL, supra note 6, at 148.
301. Viscount James Bryce, who served as British Ambassador to the United States
and was an informed observer of the American political scene, stated that the Secretary
of State "is sometimes a man of first-rate gifts, but more frequently only a politician
selected because of his party standing, and possessing little knowledge of world affairs."
2 J. BRYCE, MODERN DEMOCRACIES 373 (1921). The example par excellence is Wilson's
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Senate therefore broadens the range of experience that may be
brought to bear on a problem.802 Its utility is attested by the fact
that a galaxy of noted State Department executives-] ohn Hay,
Elihu Root, George Marshall, Robert Lovett, and W. Averill Harriman-were in the habit of consulting with the Senate.808
Harriman emphasized that if foreign policy is to obtain support,
the people must understand it; the Senate is the forum of debate
which enlightens public opinion804 and facilitates a rational decision
by the electorate. Such debate "serves to expose differences, disunity."805 Singlehanded control of foreign policy "may lead to
policies for which there is inadequate support, as with Wilson, and
had not Pearl Harbor intervened, conceivably with Roosevelt,"806
and at the moment, with Vietnam. Now that war is an instrument
of foreign policy, consultation with the Senate-and thus with the
people who are to shed their blood in effectuation of that policyselection of William Jennings Bryan, who went on to glory in the Scopes' Monkey
Trial.
302. Senator Augustus Bacon said in 1906:
There are Senators here who have been here for a generation and whose advice
and counsel would be valuable to any President •••• An Election to the Presidency
does not ipso facto endow one with all knowledge and wisdom, and it is not an
unreasonable suggestion that in the aggregate of ninety Senators, many of them
men of large experience, there is more knowledge of public affairs, more of correct
judgment, of the requirements of the public interests than is possessed by any
one man in the United States, whoever he may be.
40 CoNG. REG. 2137. Recall Benjamin Franklin's tribute to the collective judgment at
the end of the Federal Convention. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 30, at 642.
303. Hearings, supra note 13, at 262-63, 359-60; J. ROBINSON, supra note 299, at 45, 47.
Lovett stated that "when a line ••• had the imprimatur of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, we ••• [knew] that we were going to be backed up, and that is of
tremendous importance in negotiation." K. BAILEY &: D. SAMUEL, CONGRESS AT Woruc
387-88 (1952). For additional examples of presidential collaboration with the Senate,
see J. ROBINSON, supra, at 37, 50, 54; R. DAHL, supra note 6, at 207-10.
30·1. Harriman, a veteran participant in foreign affairs, stated, "[N]o foreign policy
will stick unless the American people are behind it. And unless Congress understands
it the American people aren't going to understand it." Hearings, supra note 13, at 360.
See CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, supra note 6, at 224. Even those doughty advocates of
executive agreements, McDougal and I.ans, consider that in "any situation reference of
an important international agreement to Congress has the undoubted advantage of
stimulating public discussion of the issues involved and permits the Executive's judgment to be questioned and checked by independent critics ••••" McDougal &: Lans,
supra note 5, at 555-56.
305. R. DAHL, supra note 6, at 125. "In the conduct of foreign affairs, unity is one
of the most important assets leadership can possess, disagreement one of the greatest
liabilities." Id. at 221. See also id. at 262. In addition to the examples cited by Dahl,
there is the current divisiveness over Vietnam, which toppled one President and has
strewn boulders in the path of another, in no little part because the people were not
really consulted. Compare the split in the English cabinet and Parliament immediately
before the outbreak of World War I, bridged over only when Germany invaded Belgium. B. TUCHMAN, supra note 4, at 91, 118.
306. R. DAHL, supra note 6, at 173. It was "primarily a deep-seated distrust of leadership that forced the rigid and inflexible provisions into the neutrality legislation of
the pre-war period." Id. at 248. Cf. id. at 178-79.
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is indispensable.307 Popular judgment of such issues is not to be held
in contempt.308 Viscount James Bryce, a devoted admirer of the
democratic process, deduced from a number of examples that in the
democracies the people had judged more wisely than those to whom
the conduct of foreign affairs was confided, whereas "the faults
chargeable to monarchs and oligarchies have been less pardonable
and more harmful to the peace and progress of mankind." 309
Upon a foreign policy fashioned by a behind-the-scenes conclave
which, a recent critic charges, is accountable neither to Congress nor
the people,310 McDougal and Lans have themselves made the fitting
comment:
[U]ntil we are furnished with a formula for the selection of the elite,
we are entitled to doubt that the minority has any unique monopoly of wisdom. Government by a self-designated elite-like that of
benevolent despotism or of Plato's philosopher kings-may be a
good form of government for some people, but it is not the American
way.all
307. What Joseph Story said of the power to declare war is no less applicable to
foreign policy which must embroil us in war: it is "so critical and calamitous, that it
requires the utmost deliberation, and the successive review of all the councils of the
nation . • • . The representatives of the people . • . have a right to be consulted as
to its propriety and necessity." 2 J. STORY, supra note ll8, § ll71, at 91-92. The principles which "inspire a nation's foreign policy [are] ••• too grave in consequences, to be
determined by any authority lower than that of the people." 2 J. BRYCE, supra note 301,
at 368. For a policy that entails widespread sacrifice, "widespread agreement is necessary." R. DAHL, supra note 6, at 222. 'Without it, we witness the wide-scale draft evasion
and desertion of the current Vietnam conflict.
308. In a book review of D. ACHESON, GRAPES FROM THORNS (1972), Alfred Kazin
remarks that Acheson "distrust[ed] the popular mind" and that a "striking omission"
from the "record of his years in the State Department, 'Present at the Creation,' is
any consideration of how his foreign policy related to the people." N.Y. Times, May
28, 1972, § 7, at 2, 24.
Acheson himself recorded in PRESENT AT THE CREATION 101 (1969) the "angnishing
hours" he spent in the Senate to "suffer fools gladly." "People like Mr. Acheson,''
testified Senator Fulbright, "make no bones about it. They just say [Senators] are
boobs and ought to have nothing to do with foreign policy •..•" Hearings, supra
note 13, at 468. Acheson, Ambassador Douglas Dillon stated, "made great mistakes in
foreign policy because he never took the country and the Congress into his confidence."
C. SULZBERGER, supra note 190, at 1017.
309. 2 J. BRYCE, supra note 301, at 383. Of conflicts between the Ministers and
working-class opinion over the American Civil War, the Russo-Turkish War and the
Boer War, Bryce states, "[I]n all three cases the 'classes' [who conducted foreign affairs]
would appear to have been less wise than the 'masses.'" Id. at 377, 379. Consider t.{le
gross miscalculations of the German and Austro-Hungarian regimes which triggered
World War I. See also note 295 supra.
310. R. BARNET, ROOTS OF THE WAR (1972). Senator Fulbright complained of the
"centralization of foreign policy powers in a small elite of experts and intellectuals
surrounding the President. One of the most striking revelations to emerge from the
Pentagon papers was the extraordinary secrecy with which the inner circle of the
Johnson administration made their fateful decisions of 1964 and 1965.'' Hearings, supra
note 13, at 23.
311. McDougal &: Lans, supra note 5, at 577-78. The authors were referring to a
"minority" of the Senate.

